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The First Century of Right to Arms 
Litigation 
 
By David B. Kopel1 
 
The Supreme Court’s Second Amendment jurisprudence has paid careful 
attention to the Second Amendment in the nineteenth century. District of 
Columbia v. Heller cited with approval antebellum cases which struck down 
handgun bans, or which upheld restrictions on concealed handgun carry, while 
affirming the right of open carry.2 Both Heller and McDonald v. Chicago looked 
closely at the civil rights movement after the Civil War, when Congress 
enacted legislation and the people ratified the Fourteenth Amendment, partly 
for the purpose of making the Second Amendment enforceable against state 
and local governments.3 Heller also said that some “longstanding” gun controls 
could be considered “presumptively lawful.”4 So scholars have been mining 
nineteenth-century statutes and cases to understand what types of gun laws 
have nineteenth-century roots. 
This Article examines state court cases involving the right to arms, during 
the first century following ratification of the Amendment in 1791. This is not 
the first article to survey some of those cases.5 This Article includes additional 
cases, and details the procedural postures and facts, not only the holdings. 
With three important exceptions from Illinois in 1879,6 none of the right to 
                                            
 1 Adjunct Professor of Advanced Constitutional Law, Denver University, Sturm College of 
Law. Research Director, Independence Institute, Denver, Colorado. Associate Policy Analyst, 
Cato Institute, Washington, D.C. Professor Kopel is the author of fifteen books and one 
hundred scholarly journal articles, including the first law school textbook on the Second 
Amendment: NICHOLAS J. JOHNSON, DAVID B. KOPEL, GEORGE A. MOCSARY & MICHAEL P. 
O’SHEA, FIREARMS LAW AND THE SECOND AMENDMENT: REGULATION, RIGHTS, AND POLICY 
(2012). Kopel’s website is http://www.davekopel.org. Thanks to Caitlyn Foxhoven, Stephen P. 
Halbrook, George A. Mocsary and Robert G. Natelson for helpful comments. 
2 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 585, 611–14 (2008). 
3 Heller at 614–19; McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 771–81 (2010); id. at 827–
50 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
4 Heller at 626–27. 
 5 E.g., David B. Kopel & Clayton Cramer, State court standards of review for the right to 
arms, 50 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1113 (2010) (examining standards of review used by courts in 
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries); David B. Kopel, What State Constitutions Teach 
about the Second Amendment, 29 N. KY. L. REv. 845 (2002) (surveying constitutional texts and 
judicial decisions to determine whether or not they protect an individual right); David B. Kopel, 
The Second Amendment in the Nineteenth Century, 1998 BYU L. REV. 1359 (lengthy survey of 
nineteenth century treatises, political statements, leading cases, and other sources); see also 
CLAYTON E. CRAMER, FOR THE DEFENSE OF THEMSELVES AND THE STATE: THE ORIGINAL INTENT 
AND JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE RIGHT TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS (1994) (chronological 
survey of cases); STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, FIREARMS LAW DESKBOOK (2014-15 ed.). The first 
scholarly article to survey state arms cases was Robert Dowlut & Janet A. Knoop, State 
Constitutions and the Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 7 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 177 (1982).  
6 Text at notes infra. 
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arms cases appears to have arisen as a test case: they were ordinary criminal 
or civil cases in which lawyers raised right to arms issues. The Article closely 
examines how the Supreme Court integrated the nineteenth century arms 
cases into Heller and McDonald to shape modern Second Amendment law. 
Part I briefly explains two English cases which greatly influenced American 
legal understandings. Semayne’s Case is the foundation of “castle doctrine”—
the right to home security which includes the right of armed self-defense in the 
home.7 Sir John Knight’s Case fortified the tradition of the right to bear arms, 
providing that the person must bear arms in a non-terrifying manner.8 
Part II examines American antebellum cases; these are the cases to which 
Heller looked for guidance on the meaning of the Second Amendment. Part III 
looks at cases from Reconstruction and the early years of Jim Crow through 
1891. As with the antebellum cases, the large majority of post-war cases are 
from the Southeast, which during the nineteenth century was the region most 
ardent for gun control. The heart of gun control country was Tennessee and 
Arkansas; courts there resisted some infringements of the right to arms, but 
eventually gave up.9 Heller and McDonald did not look to the Jim Crow cases 
as constructive precedents on the Second Amendment. 
 
I. The Colonial Heritage 
 
Two English cases were particularly important in shaping the American 
understanding of the right to keep and bear arms. Semayne’s Case (1604) was 
about the home, stating that “every man’s home is his castle.” This became a 
foundation of American self-defense law, the “Castle Doctrine.” The other case, 
Sir John Knight (1685), affirmed that the peaceable public carrying of arms is 
lawful, and that carrying with malicious intent to terrify people is not. 
 A. Semayne’s Case, the Castle Doctrine 
When George Berisford died, he owed a debt to Peter Semayne.10 Berisford 
had lived in a house with Richard Gresham, as joint tenants. After Berisford 
                                            
7 Text at notes infra. 
8 Text at notes infra. 
9 Text at notes infra. 
10 77 Eng. Rep. 194, 5 Coke Rep. 91a (K.B. 1604). The case had previously been argued and 
decided. According to the report of Semayne v. Gresham, 80 Eng. Rep. 21; Yelverton, 29 (1603), 
the King’s Bench Justices agreed that Semayne would lose, but disagreed on the rationale. 
One Justice, Fenner, argued that the sheriff had a right to try to break down the door, but “it 
was the sheriff's fault that he did not break it.” Semayne could not sue Gresham just because 
the sheriff did not succeed in breaking the door. Id. The decision in Semayne v. Gresham, is 
described in second report, in addition to the report written by Justice Yelverton. The final 
sentence of the other report seems to indicate that when Justice David Williams joined the 
court (Feb. 4, 1604), the decision was made to issue a new opinion, with the same result. 
Semayne v. Gresham, 72 Eng. Rep. 828; Moo. K. B. 668 (no. 917) (1604) (“Mes fuit adjudge 
quant Williams vient al bench sur l’argument des Judges overtsmt, que l'accõn no gist, et quod 
querens nihil capiat per breve.”). The final part of the sentence means “that the action did not 
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died, the house passed fully to Gresham, by survivorship. Berisford had owned 
various goods and papers which he had kept at home; Gresham retained 
them.11 
Semayne secured a writ for the Sheriff of London to seize Berisford’s goods 
to satisfy the debt. But when the Sheriff came to Gresham’s home, Gresham 
shut the door, and would not let him in. Semayne sued Gresham for frustrating 
the execution of the writ. 12  
The King’s Bench ruled against him: Gresham had a right to keep his doors 
locked, and to exclude anyone who did not knock, announce, and demonstrate 
lawful authority to enter.13  
The court explained “[t]hat the house of every one is his castle and fortress, 
and if thieves come to man’s house to rob or murder, and the owner or his 
servants kill any of the thieves in defence of himself and his house, it is not 
felony, and he shall lose nothing.”14 
Semayne’s Case was consistent with a 1499 precedent that had used similar 
language to hold that a person can gather “his friends and neighbors to help 
him” defend his home; but a person may not go to markets with an assembly 
of bodyguards.15 
                                            
lie, and that the plaintiff should take nothing by his brief.” For Justice Williams’ tenure, see 
JOHN SAINTY, THE JUDGES OF ENGLAND 1272 -1990: A LIST OF JUDGES OF THE SUPERIOR COURTS 
31 (1993). The final opinion, Semayne’s Case, was unanimous, and carefully supported by cited 
authority. 
Most English case reports in the seventeenth century, and all English reports in the 
fourteenth through sixteenth centuries, were originally written in a specialized language 
called “Law French.” English translations were published much later. In the quote above, 
“overtsmt” should have a tilde above the “m.” (Or in Law French, a “tittle”). Unfortunately, 
modern font sets are not designed with Law French even a little in mind. In Law French, a 
tittle indicates the omission of some preceding and/or succeeding letters. J.H. BAKER, MANUAL 
OF LAW FRENCH 18 (2d ed. 1990). 
11 Id., 77 Eng. Rep. at 194–95. 
12 Id. 
13 Id. at 199. 
14 Id., 77 Eng. Rep. at 194. 
15 Y.B. Trin. 14 Hen. 7 (1499), reported in Y.B. 21 Henry 7, fol. 39, Mich., pl. 50 (1506) 
(“Anonymous.” No case name): 
 
If one is in his house, and hears that such a one will come to his house to beat 
him, he may assemble folk of his friends and neighbors to help him, and aid in 
the safeguard of his person; but if one were threatened that if he should come 
to such a market, or into such a place, he should there be beaten, in that case 
he could not assemble persons to help him go there in personal safety, for he 
need not go there, and he may have a remedy by surety of the peace. But a 
man’s house is his castle and defense, and where he has a peculiar right to 
stay. 
“Surety of the peace” was a procedure by which a threatening person could be required to post 
bond for good behavior (or to have other persons post a bond on his behalf). Surety of the peace, 
BLACK’S LAW DICT. 1671 (Byron Garner ed.) (10th ed. 2014).The procedure was used in the 
United States for persons who carried arms while threatening a particular individual. See note 
__ infra. 
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Most of Semayne’s Case detailed the conditions about when and how 
sheriffs could enter homes. The foundational rule was: “In all cases when the 
King is party, the sheriff may break the house, either to arrest or to do other 
execution upon the King’s process, if otherwise he cannot enter. But he ought 
first to signify the cause of is coming, and to make request to open doors.”16 
Semayne’s maxim that “a man’s house is his castle’’ is in twenty-first 
century America probably the best-known language from any English case. In 
the U.S. Bill of Rights, the Second, Third, and Fourth Amendments are a 
cluster which protects pre-eminently (but not exclusively) the sanctity of the 
home.17 So Castle Doctrine is a foundation of the Fourth Amendment. In 1761, 
Great Britain’s Parliament authorized “writs of assistance,” which allowed the 
British army to conduct warrantless searches in order to crack down on the 
widespread import/export smuggling (for tax avoidance) that was taking place 
in New England. James Otis was the Advocate-General (like an Attorney 
General) of Massachusetts. Rather than defend the legality of the writs of 
assistance, he resigned. He then became the attorney for plaintiffs challenging 
the writs. 
His oral argument against the writs, which quoted Castle Doctrine, was 
widely reprinted, and became the most famous legal speech in colonial 
America.18 The speech’s principles were enshrined in the Fourth 
Amendment.19 Much later, the great progressive and future Supreme Court 
Justice Louis Brandeis would rely on Castle Doctrine in his seminal article 
arguing for judicial recognition of the right of privacy.20  
                                            
16 77 Eng. Rep. at 194. 
17 Cf. David I. Caplan, The Right to Have Arms and Use Deadly Force Under the Second 
and Third Amendments, 2 J. FIREARMS & PUB. POL’Y 165 (1989). 
18 James Otis, Against Writs of Assistance (Feb. 24, 1761, argument before Superior Court 
of Massachusetts), in CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS, 2 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 524 (1856) (John 
Adams’s notes recording Otis’s speech), available at 
http://constitution.org/bor/otis_against_writs.htm:  
 
Now, one of the most essential branches of English liberty is the freedom 
of one's house. A man’s house is his castle; and whilst he is quiet, he is as well 
guarded as a prince in his castle. This writ, if it should be declared legal, would 
totally annihilate this privilege. Custom-house officers may enter our houses 
when they please; we are commanded to permit their entry. Their menial 
servants may enter, may break locks, bars, and everything in their way; and 
whether they break through malice or revenge, no man, no court can inquire. 
Bare suspicion without oath is sufficient. 
 
19 See William Cuddihy & B. Carmon Hardy, A Man’s House Was Not His Castle: Origins 
of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, 37 WM. & MARY Q. 3d 371 (1980). 
20 See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 
220 (1890) (‘‘The common law has always recognized a man’s house as his castle, impregnable. 
. . .’’). 
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Semayne’s Case provided the standard American rule for the right to use 
deadly force against home invaders.21 The Supreme Court has studied 
Semayne’s Case repeatedly, recognizing its principle about repelling violent 
intruders, and examining the opinion closely to discern the meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment.22 Today, many states have passed laws to affirm the 
common law doctrine that a person who is violently attacked by a home invader 
has no duty to retreat before using deadly force. These laws are often called 
“Castle Doctrine.”  
During the first century of the American Bill of Rights, nearly all of the 
cases that involved Castle Doctrine related to when and how sheriffs or other 
government officers could enter homes.23 The right of armed home defense was 
uncontested in this period (except for slaves and for free people of color in some 
slave states);24 the few cases exploring the self-defense contours of Castle 
                                            
 21 E.g., 1 WHARTON ON CRIMINAL LAW § 633 (11th ed. 1912) (“Where one is assaulted in his 
home, or the home itself is attacked, he may use such means as are necessary to repel the 
assailant from the house, or to prevent his forcible entry, or material injury to his home, even 
to the taking of life. In this sense, and in this sense alone, are we to understand that maxim 
that, ‘Every man’s house is his castle.’”) (some internal quotation marks omitted).  
 22  There are thirteen citations since the Warren Court, including three in the twenty-
first century. See Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 594 (2006) (“an unannounced entry may 
provoke violence in supposed self-defense by the surprised resident”); Georgia v. Randolph, 
547 U.S. 103, 123 (2006) (Stevens, J., concurring); United States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31, 41 
(2003); Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609–10 (1999); id. at 622 (Stevens, J., dissenting); 
Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 95 (1998); id. at 99–100 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“The 
axiom that a man’s home is his castle…has acquired over time a power and an independent 
significance justifying a more general assurance of personal security in one’s home, an 
assurance which has become part of our constitutional tradition.); Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 
U.S. 927, 931, 932 n.2, 935–36 (1995) (“knock and announce” is a factor in determining Fourth 
Amendment reasonableness of a search; Semayne reaffirmed an ancient common law rule); 
Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 488 n.3 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring in part 
and concurring in the judgment); Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 217–19 (1981); id. 
at 228–30 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 592–93, 596–97, 615 
n.11 (1980) (“The zealous and frequent repetition of the adage that a ‘man’s house is his castle,’ 
made it abundantly clear that both in England and in the Colonies ‘the freedom of one’s house’ 
was one of the most vital elements of English liberty.”); id. at 604–05 (White, J., dissenting); 
Ker v. State of Calif., 374 U.S. 23, 47, 54 n.8, 57 n.11 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring in part); 
Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 308 (1958). 
 For analysis of Semayne’s Case as it relates to modern self-defense rights, see David I. 
Caplan & Sue Wimmershoff-Caplan, Postmodernism and the Model Penal Code v. The Fourth, 
Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments—and the Castle Privacy Doctrine in the Twenty-First 
Century, 73 UMKC L. REV. 1073 (2005). 
23 For a summary of American doctrine on this, see When a House is not a Castle, 6 ALBANY 
L.J. 379 (1872–73). 
24 See, e.g., McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 844–50 (2010) (Thomas, J., 
concurring) (collecting statutes and cases); David B. Kopel, Background Checks for Firearms 
Sales and Loans: Law, History, and Policy, 53 HARV. J. LEGISL. (2015, forthcoming) 
(additional statutes and cases), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2665432 
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Doctrine held that it applied to felons invading the home, and not to other 
situations, such as civil trespassers on land.25 
 
  B. Sir John Knight’s Case, lawful peaceable carry.  
England’s 1328 Statute of Northampton statute had provided: 
 
Item, it is enacted, that no man great nor small, of what condition 
soever he be, except the king’s servants in his presence, and his 
ministers in executing of the king’s precepts, or of their office, and 
such as be in their company assisting them, and also [upon a cry 
made for arms to keep the peace, and the same in such places 
where such acts happen,] be so hardy to come before the King’s 
justices, or other of the King’s ministers doing their office, with 
force and arms, nor bring no force in affray of the peace, nor to go 
nor ride armed by night or by day, in fairs, markets, nor in the 
presence of the justices or other ministers, nor in no part 
elsewhere, upon pain to forfeit their armour to the King, and their 
bodies to prison at the King’s pleasure.26 
 
As of 1328, the government in England was near collapse. The previous 
year, King Edward II was had been deposed by an invasion led by his wife, 
Queen Isabella (a French Princess). Isabella and her ally Roger Mortimer took 
over the government, which was nominally led by Edward III, the son of 
Edward II and Isabella. The monarchy’s ability to enforce the law was close to 
non-existent.27 
As indicated by the statutory language, the primary concern was “the 
gentry…using armed force to defeat the course of justice.”28 For decades there 
had been a problem of “magnates maintaining criminals.”29 
                                            
25 See, e.g., Lee v. State, 92 Ala. 15 (1891) (no-retreat rule applies in the home and 
curtilage); Watkins v. States, 89 Ala. 82 (1890); Mitchell v. Commonwealth, 10 Ky. L. Rptr. 
910 (1889) (applies to cellar); Wright v. Commonwealth, 85 Ky. 123, 2 S.W. 904, 908 (1887) 
(“He was not required to flee from his dwelling, but had the right to stand his ground, and use 
all the force necessary…”); State v. Patterson, 45 Vt. 308 (1873); Pierce v. Hicks, 34 Ga. 259 
(1866) (applies to a licensed tippling house, which was also part of defendant’s home); Curtis 
v. Hubbard, 4 Hill 437, 439 (N.Y. 1824) (“For a man's house is his castle, not for his own 
personal protection merely, but also for the protection of his family and his property therein, 
while it is occupied as his residence.”);  
26 I THE STATUTES: REVISED EDITION, HENRY III TO JAMES II, A.D. 1235-6—1685 at 258 
(1870); 2 Edw. 3, c. 3 (1328). 
27 Anthony Verduyn, The Politics of Law and Order during the Early Years of Edward III, 
108 ENG. HIST. REV. 842 (1993). 
28 W. R. Jones, Rex et ministri: English Local Government and the Crisis of 1341, 13 J. 
BRIT. STUDS. 1, 19 (1973). 
29 Verduyn at 849. 
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The House of “Commons’ complaints about armed noblemen” were 
congenial to Queen Isabella and her consort Roger Mortimer. Fearful of being 
overthrown, the Queen did not want armed men coming to Parliament, or 
traveling armed to meet the Queen.30 They favored a measure to render it 
“politically necessary to check dissent against the increasingly unpopular 
regime.”31 
In 1330, Edward III seized power from his mother, and faced many of the 
same problems: “one of the most profound causes of disorder was the continued 
bond of many noblemen with malefactors.32 As the young king understood, 
“many offenders were stronger than royal officials, not only because they had 
the support of the nobility, but also because they were members of the gentry 
or could draw upon the local criminal fraternity.”33  
Edward III undertook to “reinforce his officials with men-at-arms and to 
ride with them if necessary.”34 By 1332, there was sufficient feeling “that 
disorder had abated” so that Edward III could launch a war against Scotland, 
without feeling any political need to provide for keeping the peace during his 
absence.35 
While the Statute of Northampton was primarily concerned with armed 
nobles frustrating judicial process, the statutory language was not solely about 
nobles or courts. The “no part elsewhere” language could be read as general 
carry prohibition; yet that reading would render the preceding details (about 
particular places and officials) surplusage. Moreover, we know that the most 
common arm, a knife, was routinely carried, as a necessary tool for everyday 
activities such as cutting food, and necessarily available for self-defense in an 
emergency. English law required villages to provide target practice areas, and 
required families to teach their sons archery; later, the archery mandate was 
replaced with a musket mandate36 That in itself would necessarily make it 
common for people to walk around carrying arms. The 1328 statute seems 
primarily aimed at noblemen who appeared before the king or his ministers 
wearing armor; that may be why the first penalty for violators was “to forfeit 
their armour.”37  
                                            
30 Verduyn at 849. 
31 Verduyn at 856. 
32 Verduyn at 860. 
33 Verduyn at 860–61. 
34 Verduyn at 860. 
35 Verduyn at 864. 
36 33 Henry VIII, c. 3 (1541); 33 Henry VIII, c. 9 (1541); JOYCE LEE MALCOLM, TO KEEP AND 
BEAR ARMS: THE ORIGINS OF AN ANGLO-AMERICAN RIGHT 6 (1994) (mandatory longbow practice 
was later replaced by mandatory musket practice). 
37 Cf. CALENDAR OF THE CLOSE ROLLS, EDWARD III, 1337-1339 104–05 (Feb. 20, 1337, 
Hatfield) (H.C. Maxwell-Lyte ed., 1900) (order to the Sheriff of Berks explaining that men had 
been plotting “to beat, wound and ill-treat jurors” and that the Sheriff should enforce the law 
that “no one, except the king’s serjeants and ministers, shall go armed or ride with armed 
power before the justices at the said day and places, nor do anything against the peace.”). 
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Any doubts of the meaning were resolved shortly before the Glorious 
Revolution of 1688. Tensions had been rising because King James II was trying 
to disarm the entire English population, except for his political supporters. Sir 
John Knight was an Anglican and a fierce opponent of the Catholic King. Along 
with three friends, he allegedly “did walk about the streets armed with guns, 
and that he went into church of St. Michael, in Bristol, in the time of divine 
service, with a gun, to terrify the King’s subjects.”38 This resulted in arrest, 
prosecution, and then acquittal by a jury. Two different reporters wrote about 
the case.39 According to the first reporter, the Chief Justice stated that the 
statute “was to punish people who go armed to terrify the King’s subjects.”40 
The latter reporter elaborated that the Chief Justice of the King’s Bench said 
“this statute be almost gone in desuetudinem”41 for “now there be a general 
connivance to gentlemen to ride armed for their security.”42 However, “where 
the crime shall appear to be malo animo43 it will come within the act.”44 Under 
both reports, only malicious, terrifying carry was illegal. As quoted by the 
court, the Statute of Northampton applied to arms-carrying before judges and 
other government officials (“coming with force and arms before the King’s 
Justices, &c.”) or to “going or riding armed in affray of the peace.”45 The 
prosecution had a similar, narrow view of the Statute. The criminal 
Information stated that the Statute was about persons whose particular 
manner was “to terrify the King’s subjects.”46 Although the prosecutor thought 
that Knight had been carrying in terrifying manner, the jury disagreed.47 
                                            
38 Sir John Knight’s Case, 87 Eng.  Rep. 75, 76, 3 Mod. 117 (K.B. 1685).  
39 The latter reporter divided the case into two parts. The first part, dealing with the 
meaning of the Statute of Northampton, is Rex v. Sir John Knight, 90 Eng. Rep. 330; 
Comberbach, 38 (1686). 
40 87 Eng. Rep. at 76. The case is also called Rex v. Knight. 
41 A term for a statute that has become obsolete from disuse. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 404 
(5th ed. 1979). 
42 90 Eng. Rep. at 330. 
43 “With an evil mind; with a bad purpose or wrongful intention, with malice.” BLACK’S 
DICT. at 864. 
44 90 Eng. Rep. at 330.  
45 87 Eng. Rep. at 75–76. 
46 87 Eng. Rep. at 76. 
47 One scholar argues that Sir John Knight was within the statute’s exemption of the 
“king’s ministers.” Patrick J. Charles, The Faces of the Second Amendment Outside The Home: 
History versus Ahistorical Standards of Review, 60 CLEVELAND ST. L. REV. 1, 28, 30 (2012). 
One indication that Knight was not engaged in law enforcement activity on behalf of the King 
was that Knight was personally prosecuted by the Attorney General. 90 Eng. Rep. at 331. This 
is not exactly a sign of that King James II approved of what Knight was doing. 
Second, Charles has overlooked the second half of one of the case reports. The second part 
of the report is Rex v. Sir John Knight, 90 Eng. Rep. 331, Comberbach, 41 (1686). As the second 
part explains, after Knight was acquitted, the Attorney General nevertheless moved that 
Knight be required to post a bond for good behavior. The King’s Bench upheld the bond. Id. As 
discussed below, American courts also required bonds for persons whose arms-carrying 
behavior, even if not criminal, was threatening in manner. See text at notes –. The decision of 
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the King’s Bench, that John Knight should be required to post bond for good behavior, strongly 
indicates that Knight was not engaged in law enforcement.  
Going beyond the case reports, Charles cites a diary that was written in a secret code, and 
finally decoded and published in the twenty-first century. The ENTRING BOOK OF ROGER 
MORRICE (Mark Goldie ed., 2009), cited in Charles at 28–30 (12 footnotes). The diary says that 
at trial, Knight had pointed out some recent threats against him, from Irish Catholics. 
However, the Statute of Northampton had no exemption for persons subject to identifiable 
threats.  The existence of a particular threat was relevant because the statute applied solely 
to persons who carried with malignant intent. 
Charles’ assertion that Knight was acquitted “because he was a government official who 
was well-affected to the crown.” is not supported by cited source, a diary published in 1857. Id. 
at 30. The diary tells that on June 12, 1686, Knight “pleaded not guilty to an information 
exhibited against him for goeing with a blunderbuss in the streets, to the terrifyeing [of] his 
majesties subjects.” 1 NARCISSUS LUTTRELL, A BRIEF HISTORICAL RELATION OF STATE AFFAIRS 
FROM SEPTEMBER 1678 TO APRIL 1714, at 380 (1857). On December 23 of that year, 
 
sir John Knight, the loyall, was tried at the court of kings bench for a high 
misdemeanor, in goeing armed up and down with a gun at Bristoll; who being 
tried by a jury of his own city, that knew him well, he was acquitted, not 
thinking he did it with any ill design, to the great disappointment of some 
persons who appeared very fierce against him: ‘tis thought his being concerned 
in taking up a popish priest at Bristoll occasioned this prosecution. 
 
Id. at 389. So Knight was acquitted because he had no “ill design”—exactly the principle which 
the Chief Justice affirmed in describing the Statute of Northampton as applying only to carry 
malo animo.  
Charles also contends that Knight himself “even cited Richard II's statute exempting 
governmental officials from punishment.” Charles at 30 (citing without elaboration “90 Eng. 
Rep. 330). Knight’s attorney made no such argument. According to the report of the case, 
“Winnington, pro defendente. This statute was made to prevent the people’s being oppressed 
by great men; but this is a private matter, and not within the statute. Vide stat. 20 R. 2.” 90 
Eng. Rep. at 330. Rather than claiming to have been carrying arms to serve the king, Knight 
had claimed that his arms carrying was “a private matter.” He argued that the Statute of 
Northampton was only intended to cover heavily armed nobles who oppressed the public. 
 Charles believes that the citation to a statute from King Richard II meant that Knight 
was invoking a law enforcement exemption. The statute cited by Knight’s lawyer was 20 
Richard II ch. 1 (1396–97); 2 STATUTES OF THE REALM 93 (1816). Contrary to Charles, King 
Richard’s  statute did not create an exemption for people in government service. That 
exemption already existed in the Statute of Northampton (“the king’s servants in his presence, 
and his ministers in executing of the king’s precepts, or of their office”). Richard II stated the 
rule more succinctly (“save and except the King’s Officers and Ministers in doing their Office.”). 
The only novel feature of Richard II’s order was that it specifically and completely prohibited 
“launcegays”—a type of spear that was an “offensive weapon.” Id.; 2 THOMAS EDLYNE TOMLIN, 
THE LAW-DICTIONARY: EXPLAINING THE RISE, PROGRESS AND PRESENT STATE OF THE BRITISH 
LAW (London 1820) (unpageinated); GEORGE CAMERON STONE, A GLOSSARY OF THE 
CONSTRUCTION, DECORATION AND USE OF ARMS AND ARMOR IN ALL COUNTRIES AND IN ALL 
TIMES 410 (1999) (“”Lance-ague, lancegaye. A light lance, occasionally used as a dart. It was 
carried in place of the war lance in the 14th century; the latter at the time was about fourteen 
feet long and very heavy.”). An offensive weapon used exclusively by mounted nobles was very 
different from the common blunderbuss (a primitive firearm) carried by Knight. 
In sum, there is no basis in the case reports, or in Luttrell’s diary, for Charles’s assertion 
that Knight was acquitted because he was a government agent.  
10 
 
Everyone in the case agreed that the Statute of Northampton outlawed only 
carrying in a terrifying manner.48 This was in accordance with long-
established construction, as expressed, for example in Michael Dalton’s widely-
read 1622 manual of Justice of the Peace, The Country Justice,49 and likewise 
                                            
Of course information in personal diaries had no effect on the development of legal doctrine 
in America in the decades and centuries following Sir John Knight’s Case. The legal sources 
available to American judges and commentators were the case reports themselves, or treatises, 
such as Hawkins.  
48 Two weeks after Knight’s acquittal, King James II, ordered full enforcement of the Game 
Act of 1671; that act, ostensibly enacted to protect commoners from hunting on aristocrats’ 
lands, set high property qualifications for gun ownership. The King’s repression intensified 
the political crisis which led to his being overthrown in 1688, and to Parliament in 1689 
enacting a Bill of Rights, which protected the right to arms. MALCOLM. In England, a statute 
allowed a Catholic to keep firearms with permission from a local justice of the peace ‘‘for the 
defence of his House or person.’’ 1 Wm. & Mary, ch. 15 (1689). According to James Madison’s 
notes for his speech introducing the proposed U.S. Bill of Rights in Congress, among the defects 
of the English Bill of Rights was that it was a “mere act of parlt.” (and thus could be constricted 
by a future Parliament), and that is protected only protected only ‘‘arms to Protestts.’’ James 
Madison, Notes for Speech in Congress Supporting Amendments, June 8, 1789, in THE ORIGIN 
OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT 645 (David E. Young ed., 1991). 
49 MICHAEL DALTON, THE COUNTREY JUSTICE (London, William Rollins & Samuel Roycroft 
1622). Citing the Statute of Northampton, Dalton explained that the question was one of 
intent: 
 
And therefore if divers in one companie, going to the Church, Faire, or 
Market, shall goe armed, or one going to the Session, or other like assembly, 
shall go with his servants in Harnesse (to the terror of the people) though hee, 
or they, have no intent to fight, or to commit any Ryot, het this is a Rout by the 
manner of his or their going, being needlesse, disorder, and against the law. 
See the statute 2 Ed. 3. Ca. 3. 
But in the former cases, if they had gone in privie coats of Plate, shirts or 
Maile, or the like, to the intent to defend themselves some adversarie, this 
seemeth not punishable with these statutes, for that there is nothing openly 
done, in terrorum populi. 
 
Id. at 205 (chapter on Riots); see also id. at 31 (chapter on Armour) (citing Statute of 
Northampton, and its restatement for Richard II, for rule that Justice of the Peace should 
arrest “If any person shall ride, or go Armed offensively….”); MICHAEL DALTON, OFFICIUM 
VICECOMITUM: THE OFFICE AND AUTHORITIE OF SHERIFS 14 (The Lawbook Exchange 2009) 
(1623) (Sheriffs “mae and ought to arrest all such persons as goe or ride armed offensively”). 
Dalton’s treatise was very influential in England, and was also used in America. THOMAS 
GARDEN BARNES, SHAPING THE COMMON LAW 136–51 (Allen D. Boyer ed., 2008). It was “The 
most popular and authoritative justice manual during the early period” of American history. 
John A. Conley, Doing it by the Book: Justice of the Peace Manuals and English Law in 
Eighteenth Century America, 6 J. LEGAL HIST. 257, 261 (1985). 
Surprisingly, Charles does not cite Dalton. Instead, he cites some later, lesser manuals. 
Charles at 23–26. There is no evidence cited that any of these manuals ever crossed the 
Atlantic. One of these manuals explains that constables were required to organize men to keep 
“Watch” of towns from sunrise to sunset; the Watchmen were required to detain suspicious 
persons. The Watchmen had to be “sufficiently Armed.” P.B., A. HELP TO MAGISTRATES, AND 
MINISTERS OF JUSTICE 107 (2d ed., London 1700) (ch. 53). The watchmen’s duties included that 
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in a 1584 treatise explaining that concealed carry was lawful, since its manner 
could not terrify anyone.50 
When Parliament wanted to ban carrying in general, it knew how to do so, 
as in a 1695 statute against arms carrying (and possession) by Catholics in 
                                            
“The Watch in this Case are to Apprehend such as ride, or go Armed, Scouts, Evesdropers, 
Noctivagrants, Night-walker, and all sorts of Rogues and Vagabonds, &c. 1 Dalton Chap. 60. 
Folio 140. 5 Hen. 7. 5. 5 Edw. 3. 14.” Id.. This indicates that armed watchmen were, during the 
night, expected to detain suspicious characters; it does not support Charles’ assertion that 
arms-carrying was forbidden, day or night. More fundamentally, practical manuals written for 
law enforcement officers, and based on ancient statutes, are not controlling law, whereas the 
authoritative decisions of the King’s Bench Justices are.  
50  
Thomas figet chivaler ale armed south se drapes al Westminster, sur que 
suit attache, & il dit que bn Sir John Trevert luy manace, a pur sa vie saver il 
eítroit arme, & non obítant ses fuet soqs. Per agarv, & fuit prise, & il fuit 
comanuv sur quant que it poit fors. Q il ne ferra male as dit Sir Thomas. 
23.C.3.33 per hoc appiert, que home ne alera armed overtment, coment que 
soyt pur son defence, me semble que home poit aler armed ouu privie coate de 
plate south son coate, ou &c. car ceo ne poit encuter alcun feare al people, 
Quare tamen.  
 
RICHARD CROMPTON, L’OFFICE ET AUCTHORITIE DE IUSTICES DE PEACE 58 (2014) (London 1584) 
(numerous diacriticals omitted, as they are not in modern font sets). The gist of analysis is 
that “a man will not go armed overtly, event though it be for his defense, but it seems that a 
man can go armed under his private coat of plate, underneath his coat etc., because this cannot 
cause any fear among people.” Judge Posner made a similar point. Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 
933, 936–37 (7th Cir. 2012) (“Some weapons do not terrify the public (such as well-concealed 
weapons)”).  
 Crompton’s treatise may reflect a sensibility of the late sixteenth century, in favor of 
concealed carry. This is congruent with twenty-first century American sensibilities, and just 
the opposite of nineteenth century American sensibilities. See text at notes ------. 
Four decades after Crompton’s treatise was published, King James I, in the first year of 
his reign, proclaimed that “the bearing of Weapons covertly, and specially of short Dagges 
[daggers], and Pistol…had ever beene…straitly forbidden,” the practice had “is suddenly 
growen very common.” Accordingly, the carrying or import of daggers or guns shorter than 
twelve inches was forbidden. 1 ROYAL PROCLAMATION OF KING JAMES I, 1603–1625, at 285 § 
126 (1973) (proclamation Jan. 16, 1613). The proclamation may have been motivated by 
reports of Spain (England’s mortal enemy) smuggling pocket pistols into England. Id. at 284 
n.1. The same month, the King ordered the disarmament of all Catholics. Id. 
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Ireland.51 This was compliant with Bill of Rights, which had recognized an 
arms right only for “protestants.”52 
A treatise published in 1694, less than a decade after Sir John Knight’s 
Case was decided, said that the Statute of Northampton allows persons to carry 
arms “in their own defence against Illegal Violence.”53 
A leading treatise on criminal law was by William Hawkins, published in 
1716.54 It confirmed that the Statute of Northampton was for “dangerous and 
unusual” arms, not common ones: “That in some Cases there may be an Affray 
where there is no actual Violence; as where a Man arms himself with 
dangerous and unusual Weapons, in such a Manner as will naturally cause a 
Terror to the People, which is said to have been always an Offence at the 
Common Law, and is strictly prohibited by many Statutes.”55 
A half-century later, Blackstone explained the Statute: 
 
The offense of riding or going armed with dangerous or unusual 
weapons, is a crime against the public peace, by terrifying the 
good people of the land; and is particularly prohibited by the 
Statute of Northampton, upon pain of forfeiture of the arms, and 
imprisonment during the king’s pleasure: in like manner as, by 
                                            
51 An Act for the better securing the government, by disarming papists (1695) (forbidding 
arms and ammunition possession by Irish Catholics); cf. DALTON at 94 (arms of convicted 
“popish Recusants” may be seized). 
Charles cites two articles from The Post Boy, a newspaper in Dublin, Ireland, regarding 
arms licenses, and argues that they show that a stringent system of gun licensing persisted 
even after the enactment of the English Bill of Rights in 1689. Charles at 27–28. He overlooks 
the fact that The Post Boy was reporting on events in Ireland, where the Catholic population, 
as expressly stated in the English Bill of Rights, had no right to arms. Notably, his quotation 
from The Post Boy about the recall of carry licenses (many of which had been obtained 
fraudulently) applied to “all Licenses whatsoever to bear Arms, formerly Granted to any Papist 
in this Kingdom.” THE POST BOY, Dec. 19–21, 1699 at 1, col. 1. 
52 “The subjects which are protestants may have arms for their defence suitable to their 
conditions as and allowed by law.” James Madison, of course, expressly intended that the 
Second Amendment would abolish the arms restrictions on religious minorities. See note 
supra. 
53 JAMES TYRRELL, BIBLIOTHECA POLITICA 639 (London, W. Rawlins, S. Roycroft & H. 
Sawbridge 1694). The language quoted above was in the context of Tyrell’s argument that if 
the king acted contrary to the law, such as by murdering or robbing his subjects, the subjects 
had a right of armed resistance. Id. at 459–65. One reason was that “Prior to all Civil Law” is 
“the Right of Self-Defence or Preservation.” Id. at 464. 
54 WILLIAM HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN (1716). Charles cites an 
English constable’s manual from 1692, and two manuals from earlier in that century, for the 
proposition that constables should arrest anyone who does armed. Charles at 23–24. Yet the 
1708 third edition of the manual contains no such instruction. It simply says that constables 
should search for arms possessed by persons who are “dangerous” or “papists.” ROBERT 
GARDINER, THE COMPLEAT CONSTABLE 18 (3d ed. 1708). 
55 Id. at 110. 
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the laws of Solon, every Athenian was finable who walked about 
the city in armour.56 
 
Subsequent case law confirmed that peaceable carry was lawful.57 American 
state statutes likewise respected peaceable carry; for example, Massachusetts 
and Virginia adopted their own versions of the principle embodied in the 
Statute of Northampton, and they expressly limited it to carrying which was 
“offensive” or meant to cause “terror.”58 This did not foreclose some regulation 
of the manner of carry. New Jersey was the first to ban concealed carry, in 
1686.59 Not until 1966 did New Jersey limit open carry. 
                                            
56 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 4 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *148–49 (1st ed. 
1769).  
57 See Rex v. Dewhurst, 1 State Trials, N.S. 529, 601-02 (1820) (“But are arms suitable to 
the condition of people in the ordinary class of life, and are they allowed by law? A man has a 
clear right to protect himself when he is going singly or in a small party upon the road where 
he is travelling or going for the ordinary purposes of business.”); see also Rex v. Smith, 2 Ir. 
Rep. 190, 204 (K.B. 1914) (law allows peaceably walking down the road with a revolver); Rex 
v. Meade, 19 L. Times Rep. 540, 541 (1903) (right to peaceable carry does not apply to “firing 
a revolver in a public place, with the result that the public were frightened or terrorized.”). 
58 See, e.g., 2 Laws of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, from November 28, 1780 to 
February 28, 1807 652, 653 (enacted Jan. 27, 1795) (Boston: 1807) (Justices of the Peace should 
arrest “all affrayers, rioters, disturbers, or breakers of the peace, and such as shall ride or go 
armed offensive, to the fear or terrour of the good citizens of this Commonwealth, or such 
others may utter any menaces or threatening speeches”; upon conviction, such a person shall 
be required “to find sureties for his keeping the peace”).  
North Carolina’s only statutory restriction on persons going “armed” was for slaves.  
COMPLETE REVISAL OF ALL THE ACTS OF ASSEMBLY, OF THE PROVINCE OF NORTH-CAROLINA, 
NOW IN FORCE AND USE 152–53 (enacted 1753) (1773). A 1792 treatise quoted the Statute of 
Northampton as among the English statutes in effect in North Carolina. FRANCOIS-XAVIER 
MARTIN, A COLLECTION OF STATUTES OF THE PARLIAMENT OF ENGLAND IN FORCE IN THE STATE 
OF NORTH-CAROLINA 60–61 (Newbern 1792). An 1838 North Carolina statute abrogated the 
effect of all English statutes in North Carolina. Even so, the North Carolina Supreme Court 
said that the statute had merely reflected a common law principle. The common law did not 
forbid peaceable carry. State v. Huntly, 25 N.C. (3 Ired.) 418, 422–23 (1843) (“the carrying of 
a gun per se constitutes no offence…. He shall not carry about this or any other weapon of 
death to terrify and alarm, and in such manner as naturally will terrify and alarm, a peaceful 
people.”). See also text at notes infra. 
Likewise, Virginia’s 1786 analogue to the Statute of Northampton said that persons must 
not “go nor ride armed by night or by day, in fairs or markets, or in other places, in terror of 
the Country.” A COLLECTION OF ALL SUCH ACTS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF VIRGINIA, OF A 
PUBLIC AND PERMANENT NATURE, AS ARE NOW IN FORCE 30 (enacted Nov. 27, 1786) (Richmond 
1803); cf. see also GEORGE WEBB, THE OFFICE AND AUTHORITY OF A JUSTICE OF PEACE 92 
(Williamsburg 1736) (A constable “may take away Arms from such who ride, or go, offensively 
armed, in Terror of the People” and may bring the person and the arms before a Justice of the 
Peace). Webb’s treatise was endorsed by Virginia Attorney General John Clayton. Id. at ii. It 
was the first Justice of Peace manual to integrate American and English law. Conley at 273–
75. 
59 See THE GRANTS, CONCESSIONS, AND ORIGINAL CONSTITUTIONS OF THE PROVINCE OF NEW-
JERSEY 289–90 (enacted 1686) (1758) (“no Person or Persons after Publication hereof shall 
presume privately to wear any Pocket Pistol, Skeines, Stilladoes [stilettos], Daggers or Dirks, 
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American courts have cited the Statute of Northampton, sometimes with 
consideration of how it was construed by Sir John Knight’s Case and 
Blackstone, and occasionally not.60 The earliest American decision was the 
Tennessee Supreme Court’s Simpson v. State (1833), affirming that carrying 
arms in public is lawful. That case is discussed infra.61 The Supreme Court in 
Heller echoed the spirit (although not the exact doctrine) of Hawkins’s and 
Blackstone’s explication of Sir John Knight’s Case: “dangerous and unusual” 
weapons, such as machine guns or sawed-off shotguns, may be prohibited. The 
American cases on which Heller drew will be discussed below.    
 
II. Antebellum Cases 
 
From the Early Republic through the Jacksonian Era and then up to the 
Civil War, almost every right to arms case came from the South.62 This was 
probably because the South at the time was far more ardent about arms control 
than was the rest of the nation. This would become all the more true in the 
decades following the Civil War. The main line of the antebellum Southern 
cases, many of which are cited with approval in District of Columbia v. Heller, 
is that bans on concealed carry are constitutional as long as people can carry 
openly; in contrast, banning all or most handguns is unconstitutional. Based 
on Heller, most of the antebellum cases are examples of correct interpretation 
of the right to arms. 
The main line of these cases establish the following rules: 
 
• The right to arms belongs to everyone, not just the militia. 
• A law which bans all or most handguns violates the right. 
                                            
or other unusual or unlawful Weapons…”). A skein (or skain, skeyn, scjan, skean) was a 
double-edged dagger, associated with Ireland and Scotland. LOGAN THOMPSON, DAGGERS AND 
BAYONETS (1999); STONE at 566–67. Charles misreads the statute; he quotes from the 
preamble, which is a broad complaint about challenges for duels. Charles at 32. He neglects 
the operative language of the statute, which applied to the “Pocket Pistol” but not to larger 
handguns, and which only prohibited wearing the listed weapons “privately.” 
60 See, e.g., Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 936–37 (7th Cir. 2012) (examining Sir John 
Knight’s Case, Blackstone, and Edward Coke to conclude that the statute only banned arms-
carrying in certain places, or by large assemblies. “Some weapons do not terrify the public 
(such as well-concealed weapons)…”) (parenthetical in original); State v. Huntly, 25 N.C. (3 
Ired.) 418, 421 (1843) (declaring the Statute to be part of the common law, and applying the 
limitation expressed in Sir John Knight’s Case); United States v. Tot, 131 F.2d 261, 266 (3d 
Cir. 1942), rev’d on other grounds 319 U.S. 463 (1943) (Not addressing commentary, citing 
Statute for the point that “Weapon bearing was never treated as anything like an absolute 
right by the common law.”). At Tot’s level of generality, the statement is consistent with Sir 
John Knight’s Case; the right is not “absolute” since a person may not exercise the right in a 
manner calculated to terrify the public. 
61 Text at notes infra. 
 62 One exception is an 1829 case upholding Indiana’s ban on concealed carry. The very 
short opinion provides no information and no reasoning. It simply announces the result in a 
single paragraph. State v. Mitchel, 3 Blackf. 229 (Ind. 1833). 
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• Concealed carry may be prohibited as long as open carry is lawful. 
• Enhanced punishment for using especially dangerous arms in a 
violent crime does not violate the right to arms. 
• The right to keep and bear arms may not destroyed under the guise 
of regulation. 
 
We also see, in Tennessee after 1837, the deleterious effects of prohibiting 
popular arms which people are determined to own: courts must invent fanciful 
interpretations in order to uphold the bans; laws criminalizing otherwise law-
abiding citizens for carrying common arms may be enforced with harsh 
mandatory sentence, which ensnare persons who lawfully defend themselves. 
Although Tennessee’s bad example had little influence before the Civil War, 
after the War Tennessee grew worse, and its influence did spread, as we shall 
see in Part III. 
 
A. Kentucky 
Bliss v. Commonwealth (Ky. 1822).63 Bliss carried a sword-cane—that is, a 
short sword concealed inside a walking stick.64 This violated a state statute. 
Although the case report does not provide information about how Bliss came 
to the attention of the prosecutor, the statute provided that “the informer” 
would receive half of the fine.65 
The Commonwealth’s Attorney argued that the concealed carry ban was 
permissible because open carry was still lawful.66 The Kentucky Supreme 
Court disagreed. It was true “That the provisions of the act in question do not 
import an entire destruction of the right of the citizens to bear arms in defense 
of themselves and the state.”67 However, “[n]ot merely all legislative acts, 
which purport to take it away; but all which diminish or impair it as it existed 
                                            
 63 Bliss v. Commonwealth, 12 Ky. (2 Lit.) 90 (1822). “Bliss appears to be the first appellate 
decision construing a state constitutional arms provision.” State v. Christian, 249 Or. App. 1, 
38; 274 P.3d 262, 283 (2012) (Edmonds, J., dissenting). The Christian dissent contains a very 
thorough analysis of many of the nineteenth century cases. Id. at 32–45. For a careful analysis 
of the 1799 Kentucky right to arms, and its successors see Posey v. Commonwealth, 185 S.W.3d 
170, 183–203 (Ky. 2006) (Scott, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
64 Bliss, 12 Ky. at 90. 
 65  
That any person in this commonwealth who shall hereafter wear a pocket 
pistol, dirk, large knife, or sword in a cane, concealed as a weapon, unless when 
travelling on a journey, shall be fined in any sum not less than one hundred 
dollars; which may be recovered in any court having jurisdiction of like sums, 
by action of debt or on the presentment of a grand jury; and a prosecutor in 
such presentment shall not be necessary. One half of such fine shall be to the 
use of the informer, and the other to the use of this commonwealth. 
 
Bliss, 12 Ky. at 90. 
66 Id. at 91. 
67 Id. 
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when the constitution was formed, are void.”68 So Bliss’s conviction was 
overturned.69 Bliss is cited in Heller for the principle that the right to arms 
includes self-defense, not solely militia service.70 
The Heller Court also cited a Kentucky treatise, for the same individual 
right point as Bliss.71 The Treatise summarized the standard interpretation of 
the Statute of Northampton, according to Sir John Knight’s Case, and under 
the American right to keep bear arms: 
 
Riding or going armed with dangerous or unusual weapons, is a 
crime against the public peace, by terrifying the people of the land 
.... But here it should be remembered, that in this country the 
constitution guarranties to all persons the right to bear arms; 
then it can only be a crime to exercise this right in such a manner, 
as to terrify the people unnecessarily.72 
 
B. Tennessee 
 Simpson v. State (Tenn. 1833).73 According to the grand jury indictment, on 
April 1, 1833, William Simpson, a “laborer,” made an affray on a public street 
by carrying arms so as to terrorize the public.74 Two other people, “A. O., tailor, 
and B. O., blacksmith,” were involved in the affray, but were not indicted.75 
The Tennessee Supreme Court of Errors and Appeals ruled the indictment 
unconstitutional.76 The indictment did not specify what Simpson had done. 
Merely saying that he had “made an affray” was too general.77 The common 
law crime had to be narrowly construed, and the “affray” had to be described 
with particularity, so as not to violate the constitutional right to carry arms.78 
Therefore the conviction was reversed and indictment was quashed.79 Simpson 
is cited in Heller for the same principle as was Bliss.80 
                                            
68 Id. at 92. 
69 Id. at 94. 
70 Heller at 585 n.9. 
71 Heller, 554 U.S. at 588 n.10. 
72 CHARLES HUMPHREYS, A COMPENDIUM OF THE COMMON LAW IN FORCE IN KENTUCKY 482 
(Lexington: 1822). The treatise observed, “We have a statute on the subject, relating to 
concealed weapons.” Published in 1822, the treatise was apparently written before the 1822 
decision in Bliss, holding the Kentucky concealed carry statute unconstitutional. 
 73 Simpson v. State, 13 Tenn. 356 (1833). 
74 “Affray” is “The fighting of two or more persons in some public place to the disturbance 
of the people, e.g., where two or more persons voluntarily or by agreement engage in any 
fight….” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 56 (5th ed. 1979). 
75 Simpson, 13 Tenn. at 361. 
76 Id. at 362. 
77 Id. at 361. 
78 Id. at 359-60. 
79 Id. at 362. 
80 Heller at 585 n.9. 
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Aymette v. State (Tenn. 1840).81 Aymette “had fallen out with one 
Hamilton.” At  
 
about ten o’clock, p.m., he went in search of him to a hotel, 
swearing he would have his heart’s blood. He had a bowie-knife 
concealed under his vest and suspended to the waistband of his 
breeches, which he took out occasionally and brandished in his 
hand. He was put out of the hotel, and proceeded from place to 
place in search of Hamilton, and occasionally exhibited his 
knife.82 
 
Aymette was convicted of violating a state statute which prohibited concealed 
carrying of Bowie knives.83 He was sentenced to three months in jail and a 
$200 fine.84 
The Tennessee Supreme Court upheld the state statute. It construed the 
Tennessee Constitution’s right to arms clause (and by analogy in dicta, the 
U.S. Second Amendment) as protecting an “unqualified right” of citizens to 
keep arms of types which would be suitable for militia use: those “usually 
employed in civilized warfare,” which “constitute the ordinary military 
equipment.”85 In contrast, the right to arms did not encompass weapons “which 
are usually employed in private broils, and which are efficient only in the 
hands of the robber and the assassin.”86 The court did not think a bowie knife 
was suitable for military use, although the 1836 Texan War of Independence 
had already proven that incorrect, and the Civil War would again show the 
militia utility of such knives.87 
As for carrying arms, the court said that to “bear” arms meant only to bear 
them while serving in the militia and not a general right to carry arms.88 The 
U.S. Supreme Court in Heller expressly rejected Aymette, labeling it an “odd” 
decision which nevertheless supported the Heller majority’s view that the 
                                            
81 Aymette v. State, 21 Tenn. (2 Hum.) 154 (1840). 
82 Id. at 154. 
83 Id. at 154; ACTS PASSED AT THE FIRST SESSION OF THE TWENTY-SECOND GENERAL 
ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF TENNESSEE: 1837–8, at 200–01 (Nashville: S. Nye & Co., 1838) 
(“that, if any person shall wear any bowie-knife, or Arkansas toothpick, or other knife or 
weapon that shall in form, shape, or size resemble a bowie-knife or Arkansas toothpick, under 
his clothes, or keep the same concealed about his person, such person shall be guilty of a 
misdemeanor, and, upon conviction thereof, shall be fined in a sum not less than two hundred 
dollars, and shall be imprisoned in the county jail not less than three months and not more 
than six months.”). 
84 Aymette, 21 Tenn. at 154. 
85 Id. at 158, 160. 
86 Id. at 158. 
87 Id. at 158; David B. Kopel, Clayton Cramer & Joseph P. Olson, Knives and the Second 
Amendment, 47 MICH. J.L. REFORM 175, 189–90 (2013).  
88 Aymette, 21 Tenn. at 161. 
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Second Amendment protects an individual right.89 The Aymette decision was 
not particularly influential in its own time, but became influential in the South 
following the Civil War.90 Several post-Civil War cases adopted the civilized 
warfare test: arms suitable for the militia (e.g., rifles, swords, large handguns) 
are protected by the right to arms; arms supposedly suitable only for robbers 
and assassins (e.g., bowie knives, daggers) are not protected.  
Aymette reached its peak of influence in the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1939 
United States v. Miller.91 The case involved collusion between the U.S. 
Attorney, the U.S. District Court Judge and (perhaps) the defense attorney to 
bring a case to the Supreme Court to uphold the National Firearms Act of 
1934.92 Defendants Jack Miller and Frank Layton were career criminals who 
had been caught with a sawed-off shotgun, which they had not registered and 
for which they had not paid the appropriate tax.93 The defendants filed no brief 
and urged the Court to rely on the government’s brief.94 Citing Aymette (and 
no other case), the Court stated “it is not within judicial notice that this weapon 
is any part of the ordinary military equipment or that its use could contribute 
to the common defense.”95 So the Court reversed the district court’s quashing 
of the indictment, and remanded the case “for further proceedings.”96 Layton 
pled guilty and was sentenced to probation; Miller was murdered before he 
could be reprosecuted.97  
Although Miller did not use the term “civilized warfare,” the case was a 
straightforward application of the test that had been used by Aymette and its 
successors.98 However, the test would soon become unusable. During World 
War II, a typical American soldier carried a self-loading M1 Garand rifle or M1 
Carbine (a shorter, lighter type of rifle).99 After the war, these firearms became 
                                            
89 Heller at 613–14. 
90 Michael P. O’Shea, The Second Amendment Wild Card: The Persisting Relevance of the 
“Hybrid” Interpretation of the Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 81 TENN. L. REV. 597 (2014). 
91 United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939). 
92 Brian Frye, The Peculiar Story of United States v. Miller, 3 N.Y.U.J.L. & LIBERTY 48 
(2008). Cited in Heller at 623 (describing procedural history of the case). 
93 Miller at 175; Frye at 52–60. 
94 Heller at 623 (citing Frye at 65–68). 
95 Miller at 177. 
96 Miller at 183. Since the indictment had been quashed before trial, the “further 
proceedings” would have been a criminal trial. Although the militia utility of a short shotgun 
was not within judicial notice, at a trial the defendants could have introduced evidence to 
attempt to prove the weapon’s utility.  
97 Frye at 68–69. 
98 Michael P. O’Shea, The Second Amendment Wild Card: The Persisting Relevance of the 
“Hybrid” Interpretation of the Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 81 TENN. L. REV. 597 (2014); 
Michael P. O’Shea, Modeling the Second Amendment Right to Carry Arms (I): Judicial 
Tradition and the Scope of "Bearing Arms" for Self-Defense, 61 AM. U.L. REV. 585 (2012). 
99 BRUCE N. CANFIELD, THE M1 GARAND RIFLE (2013); BRUCE N. CANFIELD, BRUCE 
CANFIELD’S COMPLETE GUIDE TO THE M1 GARAND AND THE M1 CARBINE (1999); JOEY POYER & 
CRAIGH RIESCH, THE M1 GARAND, 1936-1957 (1997); LEROY THOMPSON & PETER DENNIS, THE 
M1 CARBINE (2011).  
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mainstream arms for American citizens, partly because the Army’s Civilian 
Marksmanship Program put large numbers into citizen hands at steeply 
discounted prices.100 Applying Miller and the civilized warfare test, these arms 
would be at the core of Second Amendment protection. This is an 
unproblematic result; as the Supreme Court noted in Staples v. United States, 
semiautomatic rifles (including the AR-15 at issue in Staples) “traditionally 
have been widely accepted as lawful possessions.”101 As Staples also pointed 
out, “machineguns... have the same quasi-suspect character we attributed to 
owning hand grenades.”102 
The problem with the “civilized warfare” test is that starting in the Korean 
War, the U.S. military began transitioning to automatic firearms (commonly 
called “machine guns”). Invented in 1884, automatics had never become 
popular with ordinary Americans.103 For most people, including judges, it was 
inconceivable that machine guns would be protected by the core of the Second 
Amendment. Consistent with public opinion, District of Columbia v. Heller 
recast the right in terms of self-defense, and discarded the civilized warfare 
test; under Heller, the paradigmatic Second Amendment arms are those for 
ordinary self-defense, not machine guns for warfare.104 
Day v. Tennessee (Tenn. 1857).105 Richard Day was indicted “for maliciously 
drawing a bowie-knife, from a place of concealment about his person, with 
intent to awe and intimidate one Sterling T. Bacon.”106 He was also indicted 
for having intended to stab Bacon. Day had been at Bacon’s house; there was 
an altercation, and Bacon ordered Day to leave. Day did so. Bacon followed him 
to the door-step, with a large bottle in his hand. “[D]efendant approached him 
and, laying his left hand upon Bacon’s shoulder, told him not to rush upon him, 
at the same time drawing a large knife from beneath his vest, which he held 
in his right hand behind him, but made no effort to use.”107 Day was convicted 
by the jury, and sentenced to three years in the penitentiary, the mandatory 
minimum. 
The court noted the 1838 statute banning the sale or concealed carry of 
bowie knives, and the severe penalties. Yet, these laws were “generally 
disregarded in our cities and towns.”108 
                                            
100 LARRY L. RUTH, 2 WAR BABY! COMES HOME: THE U.S. CALIBER .30 CARBINE (R. Blake 
Stevens ed., 1993); Joseph P. Tartaro, The Great Assault Weapon Hoax, 20 U. DAYTON L. REV. 
619, 622 (1995) (“[T]he M1 carbine [is] beloved by millions of war veterans, collectors, and 
recreational shooters.”); About the CMP, CIV. MARKSMANSHIP PROGRAM, 
http://thecmp.org/about/. 
101 Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 611–12 (1994). 
102 Id. 
103 JOHN ELLIS, THE SOCIAL HISTORY OF THE MACHINE GUN 151 (1975) 
104 Heller, 554 U.S. at 627. 
105 Day v. Tennessee, 37 Tenn. (5 Sneed) 496 (1857). 
106 Id. at 496. 
107 Id. at 496–97. 
108 Id. at 499. 
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The trial court had instructed the jury that it should convict Day if it found 
that he had drawn the bowie knife for self-defense. The Supreme Court 
interpreted the statute severely, finding that left no room for self-defense. “We 
regret the fate of the defendant, but the law must be enforced against offenders 
for the general good.”109 This was consistent with Aymette’s holding that since 
the Tennessee constitutional right to arms referred only to “defence of the 
state,” the right did not involve carrying for personal self-defense.110 Before the 
Civil War, Tennessee courts were the only ones to take this position.  
Heller, however, takes a much broader view. The Second Amendment 
encompasses all legitimate uses of arms: 
 
• “Americans valued the ancient [militia] right; most undoubtedly 
thought it even more important for self-defense and hunting.”111  
• “[T]he right to keep arms involves, necessarily, the right to use such 
arms for all the ordinary purposes, and in all the ordinary modes 
usual in the country, and to which arms are adapted, limited by the 
duties of a good citizen in times of peace.”112 
• “The traditional militia was formed from a pool of men bringing arms 
‘in common use at the time’ for lawful purposes like self-defense.”113  
• The right applies to arms “typically possessed by law-abiding citizens 
for lawful purposes.”114 
• While it is agreed that the Second Amendment protects militia use 
of arms, “whether it also protects the right to possess and use guns 
for nonmilitary purposes like hunting and personal self-defense is 
the question presented by this case.”115 
 
McDonald summarized “our central holding in Heller: that the Second 
Amendment protects a personal right to keep and bear arms for lawful 
purposes, most notably for self-defense within the home.”116 While self-defense 
in the home is central to the Second Amendment right, it is not the sole purpose 
of the right. 
C. Alabama 
State v. Reid (Ala. 1840).117 Reid, the Sheriff of Montgomery County, faced 
a serious threat arising out of the performance of his official duties:  
 
                                            
109 Id. at 501. 
110 Aymette at 160–61. 
111 Heller at 599. 
112 Id. at 614 quoting Andrews v. State, 50 Tenn. 165, 178 (1871)). 
113 Id. at 624. 
114 Id. at 625. 
115 Id. at 636–37. 
116 McDonald at 780. 
 117 State v. Reid, 1 Ala. 612 (1840).  
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while making a settlement as sheriff, he had been attacked by an 
individual of a dangerous and desperate character, who 
afterwards threatened his person, and came to his office several 
times to look for him. It was also proved, that these threats were 
communicated to the defendant, and the pistol brought to him by 
a friend, who conceived his life was in danger.118  
 
Sheriff Reid was convicted of carrying a concealed handgun, and sentenced to 
six hours in jail, plus a $50 fine, plus court costs.119 
He argued that the state statute against concealed carry was 
unconstitutional.120 The Alabama Supreme Court decision reflected the strong 
judicial sentiment of the day that anyone engaged in concealed carry must be 
up to no good; “it is only when carried openly, that they [arms] can be efficiently 
used for defence.”121 Modern experience with state laws which provide for fair 
and objective standards for the issuance of concealed carry permits plainly 
disprove the Alabama court’s assertion. There are many instances in which 
concealed carry permitees have used their concealed handguns for lawful self-
defense against violent attackers.122  
The Reid court cautioned that any “statute which, under the pretence of 
regulating, amounts to a destruction of the right, or which requires arms to be 
so borne as to render them wholly useless for the purpose of defence, would be 
clearly unconstitutional.”123 On the particular facts involving Sheriff Reid, 
however, the court pointed out that  
 
There was no evidence adduced, tending to show that the 
defendant could not have defended himself as successfully, by 
carrying the pistol openly, as by secreting it about his person: it 
is difficult to conceive, how one could be placed in such an 
attitude, consistently with the law which recognizes the right of 
self-protection.124  
 
Besides, Reid had the power as Sheriff to summon the posse comitatus (able-
bodied and armed men of the county) to help him enforce the law.125 
                                            
118 Id. at 612–13. 
119 Id. at 612. 
 120 ACTS PASSED AT THE ANNUAL SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF 
ALABAMA (Tuscaloosa: Hale & Eaton, 1838 [1839]), chap. 77, 67-68. 
121 Reid, 1 Ala. at 619 (brackets added). 
122 E.g., CLAYTON CRAMER, TOUGH TARGETS: WHEN CRIMINALS FACE ARMED RESISTANCE 
FROM CITIZENS (2012). For a list of some defensive gun use cases see http://www.cato.org/guns-
and-self-defense/. 
123 Reid, 1 Ala. at 616–17. 
124 Reid, 1 Ala. at 621. 
125 Id. at 621–22. For more on the posse as a past and present institution subject to the 
summons of a Sheriff, see David B. Kopel, The Posse Comitatus and the Office of Sheriff: Armed 
Citizens Summoned to the Aid of Law Enforcement, 104 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 671 (2015) 
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The court acknowledged the theoretical possibility that some other person 
might be able to show sufficient facts as to why concealed carry, rather than 
open carry, was necessary for that person—although the court was skeptical 
that such a situation could really exist.126 
Reid is twice cited with approval in Heller for the principle that there is an 
individual right to carry arms, and that the legislature may not destroy the 
right under the pretense of regulation.127 Reid’s approach to concealed carry 
was also followed not only by Heller, but also by the 1897 U.S. Supreme Court 
case Robertson v. Baldwin.128 Interpreting the Thirteenth Amendment’s 
prohibition on “involuntary servitude,”129 the Court held that a merchant 
seaman who deserted could be forced back into service; the Court reasoned that 
all constitutional rights had implicit exceptions. For example, the First 
Amendment does not prohibit punishment for libel; the Fifth Amendment’s 
Double Jeopardy clause does not prohibit a second prosecution if the first jury 
cannot reach a verdict.130 Likewise, the Second Amendment “is not infringed 
by laws prohibiting the carrying of concealed weapons.”131 
D. Arkansas 
State v. Buzzard (Ark. 1842).132 Buzzard was indicted for violating the 
Arkansas statute against concealed carry.133 The Circuit Court judge quashed 
the indictment on grounds that the statute violated the right to arms.134 By a 
2-1 decision, the Arkansas Supreme Court reversed.135 The opinion for the 
court by Chief Justice Ringo held that the concealed carry statute was a 
legitimate regulation of the right to arms.136 A concurring opinion introduced 
                                            
(describing Sheriffs’ use of posses, from ancient England to modern Colorado). 
126 Reid, 1 Ala. at 622. 
127 Heller at 585 n.9, 629. 
128 Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275 (1897). 
129 U.S. CONST., amend. XIII, § 1. 
130 Robertson at 281-82. 
131 Id. 
An 1856 Alabama statute made it illegal to “sell, or give, or lend, to any male minor” a 
pistol, air gun, bowie knife “or knife of the like kind or description.” No. 26, 1855–56 Ala. Laws 
17 (Feb. 2, 1856). The statute has obvious constitutional problems, but those were not raised 
by the defendant in Coleman v. State, 32 Ala. 581 (1858). There, the court simply found that 
Coleman’s conduct came within the scope of “lend.” Coleman was a storekeeper who let his 
nephew take a pistol that Coleman was storing for another man. Id. 
 132 State v. Buzzard, 4 Ark. 18 (1842). 
 133 Id. at 18, citing REV. STATS. ARK., Div. VIII, Ch. 44, at 280 (“every person who shall 
wear any pistol, dirk, butcher or large knife, or a sword in a cane, concealed as a weapon, 
unless upon a journey, shall be adjudged guilty of a misdemeanor.”). 
134 Buzzard, 4 Ark. at 18–19. 
135 Id. at 28, 33. 
136 Id. at 27 (“The act in question does not, in my judgment, detract anything from the 
power of the people to defend their free state and the established institutions of the country. 
It inhibits only the wearing of certain arms concealed. This is simply a regulation as to the 
manner of bearing such arms as are specified.”). 
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into American law the notion that the Second Amendment and its Arkansas 
analogue are not individual rights, but merely affirmations of government 
power over the militia.137 This new theory was not heard of again until a 1905 
Kansas Supreme Court decision.138 
E. North Carolina 
State v. Huntly (N.C. 1843).139 According to the indictment, Robert S. 
Huntly, a “laborer,” on September 1, 1843, armed himself “with pistols, guns, 
knives and other dangerous and unusual weapons,” exhibited his arms openly 
during day and night on a public highway of Anson, N.C., and declared his 
intent “to beat, wound, kill and murder” James H. Ratcliff.140 The dispute 
between Huntly and Ratcliff involved some slaves, which Huntly demanded 
that Ratcliff turn over to him.141 Huntly was convicted of the common law 
offense derived from the Statute of Northampton, namely of going armed in 
public with the purpose of terrifying the public. 
The North Carolina Supreme Court upheld the conviction, while adding a 
reminder that gun carrying in itself was lawful. According to the Court, “No 
man amongst us carries it [a gun] about with him, as one of his every day 
accoutrements--as a part of his dress.”142 The Court hoped that this would 
never change.143 Even so, 
 
[I]t is to be remembered that the carrying of a gun per se 
constitutes no offence. For any lawful purpose—either of business 
or amusement—the citizen is at perfect liberty to carry his gun. 
It is the wicked purpose—and the mischievous result—which 
essentially constitute the crime. He shall not carry about this or 
any other weapon of death to terrify and alarm, and in such 
manner as naturally will terrify and alarm, a peaceful people.144  
 
                                            
 137 Buzzard at 32–33 (Dickinson, J., concurring.) 
138 Salina v. Blaksly, 72 Kan. 230, 83 P. 619 (1905); David B. Kopel, The Second 
Amendment in the Nineteenth Century, 1998 BYU L. REV. 1359. The Kansas Court went far 
out of its way to nullify the state and federal right to arms. Neither party had made a right to 
arms argument. Robert Dowlut, The Right to Arms: Does the Constitution or the Predilection 
of Judges Reign? 36 OKLA. L. REV. 65, 77 (1983). 
 139 State v. Huntly, 25 N.C. (3 Ired.) 418 (1843). 
 For analysis of the North Carolina right, see Stephen P. Halbrook, The Right to Bear Arms 
in the First State Bills of Rights: Pennsylvania, North Carolina, Vermont, and Massachusetts, 
10 VT. L. REV. 314 (1985); Carl W. Thurman, III, Note, State v. Fennell: The North Carolina 
Tradition of Reasonable Regulation of the Right to Bear Arms, 68 N.C. L. REV. 1078 (1990). 
140 Huntly, 25 N.C. at 418–19. 
141 Id. at 419. 
142 Id. at 422. 
143 Id. 
144 Id. at 422–23. 
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Heller cites Huntley for its “broad public-safety understanding” of the scope of 
the individual right to arms, as a right not solely for the militia.145  
                                            
145 Heller at 586 n.9, 601. Patrick Charles argues that Huntly “provides substantiated 
evidence that the tenets of the Statute of Northampton survived well into the nineteenth 
century.” Charles, supra, at 36. This is true in one narrow sense. The North Carolina 
legislature in 1838 had declared that no English statute had any continuing legal effect in the 
state. Huntly at 420. However, the Huntly court found that the common law prohibition 
against carrying arms in a threatening manner (as Huntly had done), still had force in the 
state. Id. at 420–21. This was consistent with Sir John Knight’s Case, which said that the 
legality of carrying arms depended on whether the manner was maliciously calculated to 
terrify the public. Text at notes supra. 
Charles, however, goes further, and argues that Huntly indicates that carrying arms for 
self-defense was unlawful. Charles at 37. He bases this argument on the Huntly court’s 
statement that arms carrying is a constitutional right, for “any lawful purpose—either of 
business or amusement.” Id.; Huntly at 422. According to Charles, “business or amusement” 
does not include self-defense. Charles at 37. This is a strained and narrow reading overlooks 
the phrase that “business or amusement” was a legal term of art, to encompass all activity. 
That was how Chief Justice Marshall used the phrase. See  The Schooner Exchange v. 
Mcfaddon & Others, 7 Cranch 116 (1812) (“the ports of a nation are open to the private and 
public ships of a friendly power, whose subjects have also liberty without special license, to 
enter the country for business or amusement…”); Johnson v. Tompkins, 13 F. Cas. 840, No. 
741 (Baldwin, Circuit Justice, Cir. Ct. E.D. Penn. 1833) (“any traveller who comes into 
Pennsylvania upon a temporary excursion for business or amusement”); Baxter v. Taber. 4 
Mass. 361, 367 (1808) (“he may live with his family, and pursue his business, or amusements, 
at his pleasure, either on land or water…”); Respublica v. Richards, 2 U.S. 224 (Penn. 1795) 
(same language as Johnson v. Tompkins). 
Charles also cites a nineteenth century English treatise as demonstrating the acceptance 
of a restrictive interpretation of the Statute of Northampton in nineteenth century America. 
Charles at 40 n.211 (in section on “The Statute of Northampton in Nineteenth Century 
America”) (citing the treatise by Sir William Oldnall Russell). This overlooks the fact that the 
American reprint of Russell’s English text explained “for through there is much statute law 
inapplicable to this country, yet the cases decided on the construction of these statutes are 
very interesting…”). G.S. Advertisement to the Ninth American Edition, in 1 WILLIAM OLDNALL 
RUSSELL, A TREATISE ON CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS vii (9th Amer. ed., Phil., T. & J. W. 
Johnson & Co.1877).  
More to the point on American law, Charles cites Chancellor Kent. Charles at 40, n.212. 
But although Charles says that Kent was expressing “the legal tenets imbedded in the Statute 
of Northampton,” the quoted text is simply Kent urging a prohibition on “the practice of 
carrying concealed weapons.” Id. Notably, Charles is quoting Kent’s eighth edition, from 1854, 
about laws which “would be very desirable.” This indicates that Kent did not consider laws 
against concealed to be the rule in most states. To the contrary, on the very page cited by 
Charles, Kent wrote:  
 
As to the Constitution of the United States, and the constitution of several of 
the states, in terms more or less comprehensive, declare the right of the people 
to keep and bear arms, it has been a subject of grave discussion, in some of the 
state courts, whether a statute probibiting persons, when not on a journey, or 
as travellers, from wearing or carrying concealed weapons, be constitutional. 
There has been a great difference of opinion on the question.  
 
JAMES KENT, 2 COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW *405–06 note a (8th ed., N.Y., William Kent 
1854). At the end of the footnote is sentence quoted by Charles, urging the desirability of 
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State v. Newson (N.C. 1844).146 Elijah Newsom, “a free person of color,” was 
convicted by a jury of carrying a shotgun without having obtained a license 
from Cumberland County’s Court of Pleas and Quarter Sessions.147 This 
violated an 1841 state statute barring free people of color from possessing 
firearms without a license.148 The Superior Court judge arrested the judgment 
of conviction because the statute was unconstitutional.149 
The North Carolina Supreme Court ruled the statute consistent with 
longstanding state laws which had imposed disabilities on the free black 
population, such as a 1777 statute prohibiting “colored persons within the 
fourth degree from being heard as witnesses against a white man.” Similarly, 
an 1835 state constitutional amendment had stripped voting rights from free 
blacks. The decision of the court below was reversed.150 
F. Georgia 
Nunn v. State (Ga. 1846).151 Nunn was prosecuted for violating an 1837 
statute which banned sale, possession, and carrying of all handguns, except 
“horsemen’s pistols.”152 After conviction, he appealed to the Georgia Supreme 
Court, which reversed his conviction and quashed the proceeding. 
The court ruled that insofar as the 1837 statute banned concealed carry, it 
was constitutional, but the indictment had not charged that Nunn had carried 
                                            
prohibiting concealed arms. The full footnote from Kent thus demonstrates the opposite of 
Charles’s theory that the 1328 Statute of Northampton prohibited all defensive arms carrying 
(open or concealed) in nineteenth century America. 
 146 State v. Newsom, 27 N.C. (5 Ired.) 250 (1844). 
147 Id. at 250–51. 
148 An Act to prevent Free Persons of Colour from carrying Fire-arms, ch. 30, 1840-1841 
N.C. Laws 61 (Jan. 11, 1841). 
149 Newsom, 25 N.C. at 251. 
150 Id. at 252–54. 
There are other cases from the antebellum period involving firearms disabilities (either 
bans or licensing statutes) for slaves and for free persons of color, since such persons had few 
if any constitutional rights. E.g., Aldridge v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. 447, 449 (Gen. Ct. 1824) 
(noting the many restrictions on free blacks, including “upon their right to bear arms”). Waters 
v. State, 1 Gill 302, 309 (Md. 1843) (among the many restrictions on free blacks are laws “to 
make it unlawful for them to bear arms”). Both Aldridge and Waters were cited in Heller for 
recognition that the right to arms is an individual right, not for militia only. Heller at 611–12. 
These laws are of course no legitimate precedent for modern gun control; they exemplify the 
error of depriving persons of constitutional rights because of race or similar characteristics.  
In dissent, Justice Stevens argued the Aldridge quote might have referred only to blacks 
being forbidden to bear arms when they were serving in the state militia. Id. at 662 n.29 
(Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia replied that blacks had been excluded from the Virginia 
militia for thirty years before Aldridge was decided. Id. at 612 n.21 (maj. op.) 
 151 Nunn v. State, 1 Ga. 243 (1846). 
 152 ACTS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF GEORGIA PASSED IN MILLEDGEVILLE 
AT AN ANNUAL SESSION IN NOVEMBER AND DECEMBER, 1837, 90-91 (Milledgeville: P. L. 
Robinson, 1838) (“An Act to guard and protect the citizens of this State against the 
unwarrantable and too prevalent use of deadly weapons”). 
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his handguns concealed.153 The ban on open carry of handguns was 
unconstitutional.154 So was the handgun ban, and the fact that horse pistols 
were still allowed did not save it.155  
The Heller Court applauded Nunn because it “perfectly captured” the 
relationship between the first and second parts of the Second Amendment.156 
The longest block quote in Heller is from Nunn: 
 
The right of the whole people, old and young, men, women and 
boys, and not militia only, to keep and bear arms of every 
description, and not such merely as are used by the militia, shall 
not be infringed, curtailed, or broken in upon, in the smallest 
degree; and all this for the important end to be attained: the 
rearing up and qualifying a well-regulated militia, so vitally 
necessary to the security of a free State. Our opinion is, that any 
law, State or Federal, is repugnant to the Constitution, and void, 
which contravenes this right, originally belonging to our 
forefathers, trampled under foot by Charles I. and his two wicked 
sons and successors, re-established by the revolution of 1688, 
conveyed to this land of liberty by the colonists, and finally 
incorporated conspicuously in our own Magna Charta!157  
 
As of 1846, there was no right to arms in the Georgia Constitution.158 
Notwithstanding Barron v. Baltimore,159 the Nunn court ruled that the Second 
Amendment did apply to the Georgia state courts: 
 
The language of the second amendment is broad enough to 
embrace both Federal and State governments-nor is there 
anything in its terms which restricts its meaning…..[D]oes it 
follow that because the people refused to delegate to the general 
government the power to take from them the right to keep and 
bear arms, that they designed to rest it in the State governments? 
Is this a right reserved to the States or to themselves? Is it not an 
                                            
153 Nunn, 1 Ga. at 250. 
154 Id. 
 155 Id. at 247. “Horse pistols” were large handguns, usually sold in a pair, along with a 
double holster that was meant to be draped over a saddle. They were too large for practical 
carry by a person who was walking. Lewis & Clark Fort Mandan Foundation, Horse Pistols, 
http://www.lewis-clark.org/content/content-article.asp?ArticleID=2380.  
156 Heller at 612. 
 157 Nunn at 251 (emphasis in original); Heller at 612–13. 
158 In 1865, a new Georgia Constitution copied the Second Amendment verbatim. GA. 
CONST., art. I, § 4 (1865). The current version states: “The right of the people to keep and bear 
arms shall not be infringed, but the General Assembly shall have to prescribe the manner in 
which arms may be borne.” GA. CONST., art. I, § 1 ¶VIII (1983) (retaining language adopted in 
1877). 
159 Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833). 
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unalienable right, which lies at the bottom of every free 
government? We do not believe that, because the people withheld 
this arbitrary power of disfranchisement from Congress, they 
ever intended to confer it on the local legislatures. This right is 
too dear to be confided to a republican legislature.160 
 
 As the Nunn court acknowledged, the U.S. Supreme Court had held that 
Bill of Rights was only a limit on the federal government.161 But many state 
judges considered Barron to be authoritative only for federal courts. State 
supreme courts, on this view, were still free to enforce the Bill of Rights. 
Significantly, under the federal Judiciary Act of 1789, the U.S. Supreme Court 
had jurisdiction to review cases in which a state court had found a state law to 
be constitutional, but not to review cases in which a state court found a state 
law to violate the U.S. Constitution. The Supreme Court was not granted 
power over the latter class of cases until the early twentieth century.162 There 
were dozens of state cases applying parts of the federal Bill of Rights to states; 
Nunn cited the grand-daddy of them all, People v. Goodwin, in which New 
York’s highest court applied the rule against Double Jeopardy to state and local 
action.163 Nunn itself became a leading case in this line, although it had plenty 
of company.164 
 After the Civil War, the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, in part for 
the purpose of overturning two Supreme Court decisions. One was Barron, 
with the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause being 
                                            
160 Nunn, 1 Ga. at 250 (emphasis in original). Cf. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 388 (1798) (ex 
post facto laws are necessarily illegal, and not true laws, regardless of whether a constitution 
specifically prohibits them). 
As noted by Justice Thomas in his McDonald concurrence, two years later the Georgia 
Court stated that “[f]ree persons of color have never been recognized here as citizens; they are 
not entitled to bear arms”. 561 U.S. at 849 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting Cooper v. 
Savannah, 4 Ga. 68, 72 (1848)). Cooper freed prisoners who had been imprisoned and then 
hired out for not paying a $100 tax required for free persons of color who moved to the city. 
Imprisonment and forced servitude for non-payment of taxes “is repugnant to the laws of the 
State,” the Court ruled. 4 Ga. at 74. 
161 Nunn, 1 Ga. at 250; Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833). 
 162 See McDonald at 842–43 (Thomas, J., concurring); AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF 
RIGHTS 145–56 (1998) (discussing ‘‘the Barron contrarians’’); Jason Mazzone, The Bill of Rights 
in Early State Courts, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1 (2007). As examples of antebellum state courts 
applying the Bill of Rights to the states, Justice Thomas cited, inter alia, Nunn, State v. 
Buzzard, 4 Ark. 18, 28 (1842); State v. Jumel, 13 La. Ann. 399, 400 (1858); and Cockrum v. 
State, 24 Tex. 394, 401–404 (1859). McDonald at 843 n.16. These other three cases are 
discussed at -------. 
 163 Nunn at 250 (citing People v. Goodwin, 18 Johns. Rep. 187, 200, 1 Wheeler C.C. 470, 9 
Am. Dec. 203 (N.Y. 1820)). 
164 See Mazzone at 35–54 (citing dozens of cases for the Fourth Amendment; about a dozen 
for Fifth Amendment takings; seven for Double Jeopardy; a half-dozen for Due Process or Self-
incrimination; five for the Sixth Amendment; one for First Amendment religion; and four for 
the Seventh Amendment).  
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intended to make the Bill of Rights applicable to the states.165 The other was 
Dred Scott; it had held that Blacks are not citizens of the United States, and 
warned that a contrary result would mean that Blacks could “keep and carry 
arms wherever they went.”166 The citizenship clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment reversed Dred Scott’s citizenship rule.167 
 
G. Louisiana 
State v. Chandler (La. 1850).168 Like Georgia, Louisiana did not have an 
enumerated state constitutional right to arms before the Civil War.169 So like 
the Georgia Supreme Court, the Louisiana Supreme Court treated the Second 
Amendment as enforceable in state courts.  
Chandler was convicted in New Orleans for manslaughter of Patrick C. 
Daley, on Oct. 7, 1848.170 On appeal, the Louisiana Supreme Court reversed, 
because the trial judge had prevented the jury from hearing all the facts.171 By 
Chandler’s account, “Daley actually attacked Chandler, and was beating his 
head against a brick wall so as to put his life really in danger, and Chandler 
then killed his assailant from absolute necessity to preserve his own life.”172 
The prosecution, though, had contended that “Daley was unarmed and sick, 
and only in consequence of a quarrel with Chandler’s wife the preceding 
evening, the latter was so enraged that he rushed upon and gave him four stabs 
with a Bowie knife, until then concealed in his bosom–Daley being a perfectly 
passive victim.”173 
Also, the judge had instructed the jury, “I have rarely known a case in which 
the crime of murder was more clearly brought home to the prisoner, and I 
cannot think you can entertain any reasonable doubt of his guilt.”174 But this 
was deemed harmless, since the jury only convicted for manslaughter.175 
The court had no trouble upholding Louisiana’s statute against concealed 
carry.176 Open carry “places men upon an equality. This is the right guaranteed 
                                            
165 McDonald v. Chicago (Thomas, J., concurring). 
166 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 417 (1857). 
167 McDonald at 807–08 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 168 State v. Chandler, 5 La. Ann. 489 (1850). 
169 The first Louisiana right to arms provision was adopted in LA. CONST., art. 3 (1879) 
(copying the Second Amendment, and adding a sentence allowing punishment for carrying 
concealed weapons). The current provision states: “The right of each citizen to keep and bear 
arms is fundamental and shall not be infringed. Any restriction on this right shall be subject 
to strict scrutiny.” LA. CONST., art I, § 11 (amended 2012) 
170 Chandler, 5 La. Ann. at 489. 
171 Id. at 490. 
172 Id. 
173 Id. 
174 Id. 
175 Id. 
 176 Act of Mar. 25, 1813, making it a misdemeanor to be “found with a concealed weapon, 
such as a dirk, dagger, knife, pistol, or any other deadly weapon concealed in his bosom, coat, 
or any other place about him, that does not appear in full open view.” 
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by the Constitution of the United States, and which is calculated to incite men 
to a manly and noble defence of themselves, if necessary, and of their country, 
without any tendency to secret advantages and unmanly assassinations.”177 
The record does not indicate that Chandler was actually convicted of violating 
the concealed carry statute, but apparently his violation was used as evidence 
of his nefarious intent in the homicide case against him. 
Starting with North Dakota in 1923, states would begin formalizing this 
approach, adopting statutes that in a prosecution for a violent crime, the 
defendant’s carrying of a concealed handgun without a carry permit was prima 
facie evidence of intent to use the handgun in the crime.178 The statute was a 
model law, originally known at the Revolver Association Act, since it was 
proposed by the United States Revolver Association, as an alternative to the 
New York State 1911 law which required a permit to purchase or possess a 
handgun. Soon, the Revolver Association Act was adopted, with revisions, by 
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, and 
became known as the Uniform Firearms Act.179  
Chandler is thrice cited with approval in Heller, for the principle that the 
individual right to arms includes the right to open carry.180 In opposition to 
Tennessee’s Aymette, Chandler holds that the Second Amendment protects the 
right to carry arms in public (not just during militia service), and that bowie 
knives are among the arms protected by the Second Amendment.181 
State v. Smith (La. 1856).182 Smith was convicted of carrying a concealed 
pistol.183 It was undisputed that the pistol in his pocket was “partially 
exposed.”184 The Louisiana Supreme Court reaffirmed that the concealed carry 
statute does not violate the Second Amendment. The court ruled that “partial 
concealment of the weapon” because of “want of capacity in the pocket to 
contain, or clothes fully to cover the weapon” violated the statute.185 This was 
contrasted with the lawful “carrying of such weapon in full open view, and 
partially covered by the pocket or clothes.”186 
The above standard is confusing. The issue of partial concealment continues 
to arise today. All but a few states today have objective licensing systems, by 
which law-abiding, trained adults can obtain concealed carry permits. But 
what if the handgun, which by law must be concealed, is momentarily exposed? 
                                            
177 Id. 
178 Uniform Firearms Act (1926), § 2; David B. Kopel, Background Checks for Firearms 
Sales and Loans: Law, History, and Policy, 53 HARV. J. LEGISL. (2015, forthcoming), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2665432. 
179 Kopel, Background Checks, at ___. 
180 Heller at 586 n.9, 613, 626. 
181 Chandler, 5 La. Ann. at 490–91. Chandler’s arm was a bowie knife. Id. at 491. 
 182 State v. Smith, 11 La. Ann. 633 (1856). 
183 Id. at 633. 
184 Id.  
185 Id.  
186 Id.  
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For example, it is worn in a holster inside the waistband, on the back; when 
the licensee bends over, her shirt rises up, and a small portion of the handgun 
is momentarily revealed? Or some other extended movement makes the gun 
“print,” so that its outline is visible through clothing? People get prosecuted 
and convicted for such offenses, and legislatures sometimes refine their 
statutes to make it clear that transient exposure does not violate the 
requirement that the handgun be carried concealed.187 To address the problem, 
some states enacted statutes specifying that carrying a gun in an exposed 
holster on the belt is still considered “open” carry, even though the holster will 
necessarily obscure a portion of the gun.188 
State v. Jumel (La. 1858).189 Jumel was convicted of violating the latest 
version of Louisiana’s concealed carry statute, which had been enacted in 
1855.190 The Louisiana Supreme Court speedily disposed of his appeal, citing 
Chandler and Smith: “The statute in question does not infringe the right of the 
people to keep or bear. It is a measure of police, prohibiting only a particular 
mode of bearing arms which is found dangerous to the peace of society.”191 
                                            
187 Mississippi used to ban carrying a handgun concealed, “in whole or in part.” One judge 
noted the overbreadth of this language: “Conceivably, carrying a revolver suspended from the 
neck by a leather throng could be partially concealing it.” L.M., Jr. v. State, 600 So.2d 967, 971 
(Miss. 1992) (Lee, C.J., concurring). In 2013, Mississippi added clarifying language. In the 
statute against carrying a concealed handgun without a license, “‘concealed’ means hidden or 
obscured from common observation and shall not include…a loaded or unloaded pistol carried 
upon the person in a sheath, belt holster or shoulder holster that is wholly or partially visible, 
or carried upon the person in a scabbard or case for carrying the weapon that is wholly or 
partially visible.” Miss. Code § 97-37-1(4); Miss. House Bill 2 (2013). 
Virginia’s regulations on “concealed” carry have been judicially interpreted to apply only 
when the arm is .“hidden from all except those with an unusual or exceptional opportunity to 
view it.” Main v. Commonwealth, 20 Va. App. 370, 372 (Va. App. 1995) (en banc). This would 
include a handgun “in one’s back pocket … if the handle of the weapon, the only part of the 
weapon extending outside of the pocket, is concealed by [a] duffle bag.” Id. 371–73. “Concealed” 
also encompassed a “handgun in a pocket compartment in the fabric covering the back of the 
passenger's seat” of an automobile, which a police officer only saw when he peered “down into 
the seat’s pocket compartment from directly above.” Clarke v. Commonwealth, 32 Va. App. 
286, 303 (Va. App. 2000). Something that was not “concealed” was a knife “sticking one-half to 
three-quarters of an inch out of [one’s] right back pants pocket,” even though the small amount 
of visible handle did not immediately indicate that the item was a knife. Richards v. 
Commonwealth, 18 Va. App. 242 (Va. App.1994). 
188 For an early example, see California’s version of the Revolver Association Act/Uniform 
Firearms Act: An act to control and regulate the possession, sale and use of pistols, revolvers 
and other firearms capable of being concealed upon the person…., Ch. 339, §5, 1923 Cal. Stat. 
695, 697 (June 13, 1923) (No concealed permit needed for handguns “carried openly in a belt 
holster” or “knives which are carried openly in sheaths suspended from the waist of the 
wearer.”). 
 189 State v. Jumel, 13 La. Ann. 399 (1858). 
 190 Act of March 14th, 1855, § 115, (Sess. Acts, p. 148). 
191 Jumel, 13 La. Ann. at 399. 
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H. Texas 
Cockrum v. State (Tex. 1859).192 A Texas statute provided that if a person 
convicted of manslaughter had used a “bowie-knife or dagger,” the jury could 
impose the maximum non-capital sentence: solitary confinement for life.193 
Cockrum’s conviction was reversed because of defective jury instructions.194 
The Texas Supreme Court addressed other issues that Cockrum had raised on 
appeal, since they would be necessary for his retrial.195 
The Texas Constitution right to arms included the right to carry bowie 
knives, said the court.196 However, the sentencing enhancement did not violate 
the right, because of the bowie knife was “the most deadly of all weapons in 
common use.”197  
The right to arms included the legitimate use, not the abuse, of weapons. 
The constitutional limit on punishing abuse was that “the legislature could not 
affix such a punishment to the abuse, as, in its nature, must deter the citizen 
from its lawful exercise; for that would be tantamount to its prohibition.”198 
The enhanced sentencing statute did not transgress this rule.199 
The Texas enhanced sentencing statue is an example of a traditional, 
longstanding gun control that does not violate the right to arms. Today, 
enhanced sentencing for use of a firearm in a violent crime is widespread in 
state and federal law. The first model legislation with this rule was the 
Revolver Association Act from the 1920s, which subsequently became the 
Uniform Firearms Act.200 
Other antebellum courts made the same point as Texas. The Missouri 
Supreme Court in State v. Schoultz wrote that “the right to bear does not 
                                            
192 Cockrum v. State, 24 Tex. 394 (1859). 
193 Id. at 397. 
194 Id. at 400. 
195 Id. at 401. 
 196 Id. For analysis of all the right to arms cases in Texas, see Stephen Halbrook, The Right 
to Bear Arms in Texas: The Intent of the Framers of the Bill of Rights, 41 BAYLOR L. REV. 629 
(1989). 
 197   
It is an exceedingly destructive weapon. It is difficult to defend against it, by 
any degree of bravery, or any amount of skill. The gun or pistol may miss its 
aim, and when discharged, its dangerous character is lost, or diminished at 
least. The sword may be parried. With these weapons men fight for the sake of 
the combat, to satisfy the laws of honor, not necessarily with the intention to 
kill, or with a certainty of killing, when the intention exists. The bowie-knife 
differs from these in its device and design; it is the instrument of almost certain 
death. He who carries such a weapon, for lawful defence, as he may, makes 
himself more dangerous to the rights of others, considering the frailties of 
human nature, than if he carried a less dangerous weapon. 
 
Cockrum, 24 Tex. at 402–03. 
198 Id. at 394. 
199 Id. 
200 Uniform Firearms Act § 3 (1926); Kopel, Background Checks, supra. 
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sanction an unlawful use of arms.”201 The point was used by analogy in cases 
upholding libel prosecutions—which by the courts’ analysis involved a 
defendant who misused the First Amendment to harm someone else.202 
Heller cited with approval the following cases, discussed above: Bliss (Ky. 
1822), Simpson (Tenn. 1833), Reid (Ala. 1840), Huntly (N.C. (1843), Nunn 
(1846), Chandler (La. 1850), and Schoultz (Mo. 1857), and also cited the libel 
cases. The only antebellum case the Court specifically declared to be wrong 
was Aymette (Tenn. 1840).203 
Collectively, the cases show the mainstream antebellum view on the right 
to arms: concealed carry in public may be banned, as long as open carry is 
allowed; bans on particular arms are impermissible (except under the 
disfavored jurisprudence of Tennessee); however, enhanced sentencing may be 
applied to violent crimes involving especially deadly arms; misuse of the right, 
by using arms to commit a violent crime, may be punished; the right belongs 
to all Americans who are entitled to the ordinary scope of civil rights. 
 
III. Gun Litigation during Reconstruction and Jim Crow 
 
Things changed drastically in the South during Reconstruction. Then they 
changed back. As Reconstruction gave way to Jim Crow, courts became 
increasingly tolerant of gun control. Heller and McDonald looked to 
                                            
201 State v. Shoultz, 25 Mo. 128, 155 (1857).  
202 “The liberty of the press was to be unrestrained, but he who used it was to be responsible 
in case of its abuse; like the right to keep fire arms, which does not protect him who uses them 
for annoyance or destruction.” Commonwealth v. Blanding, 20 Mass. (3 Pick.) 304, 314 (1825), 
cited in Heller at 602. 
As stated by the Territorial Supreme Court of Michigan: 
 
The constitution of the United States also grants to the citizen the right to keep 
and bear arms. But the grant of this privilege cannot be construed into the 
right in him who keeps a gun to destroy his neighbor. No rights are intended 
to be granted by the constitution for an unlawful or unjustifiable purpose. 
 
United States v. Sheldon, 1829 WL 3021 (Terr. Mich. 1829) (also in 5 TRANSACTIONS OF THE 
SUPREME COURT OF THE TERRITORY OF MICHIGAN 337, 346 (W. Blume ed.1940). The block quote 
above is quoted in Heller at 612. 
203 The Court also cited State v. Dempsey, 31 N.C. 384, 385 (1849) for the fact that “keep 
arms” encompassed the keeping of arms by persons who were not in the militia. Heller at 583 
n.7. Dempsey involved the application of the North Carolina statute, discussed above at ----, 
requiring that a person of color must have a licenses in order “to carry about his person or keep 
in his house” any arms. Dempsey at 385. Other than the quote from the statute, Dempsey has 
no contribution to arms rights jurisprudence; the case is entirely about whether Dempsey falls 
with the statutory definition of “persons of mixed blood,” based on a fourth generation ancestor. 
Id. at 386-88. 
As discussed infra, the court also cited four other cases which briefly mentioned arms laws 
or arms rights. See text at notes -----. These cases were cited to illustrate for the basic point 
that the Second Amendment is a general individual right to possess and carry weapons. They 
do not tell us a great deal beyond this basic point. 
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Reconstruction for interpretive guidance about the Second Amendment.204 
They did not look for guidance from cases or statutes from the post-
Reconstruction Jim Crow era.  
Based on Heller and McDonald, some of these cases described in this Part 
III demonstrate an incorrect understanding of the right to arms; for example, 
some uphold bans on the majority of handguns. Many of the cases from this 
period may be analogized to the cases in this period upholding censorship laws, 
which violated the First Amendment, as detailed by David Rabban’s excellent 
Free Speech in its Forgotten Years, 1870-1920.205 
 
A. Mississippi 
After the Confederate army surrendered at Appomattox, state legislatures 
in the ex-Confederate states began to address the new reality. They accepted 
the national consensus that de jure slavery was finished. But many 
Southerners wanted to keep the freedmen in a state of de facto servitude. So 
ex-confederate states enacted Black Codes, modeled after the Slave Codes, 
restricting or prohibiting the freedmen from exercising many rights of 
citizenship. For example, Alabama forbade people of color to possess arms, 
while Mississippi and Florida only allowed them to do so if they received a 
license.206 These actions outraged Congress, which in 1866 passed the Second 
Freedmen’s Bureau Bill (applying only to states under military rule), ordering 
the Union commanders in the South to protect the rights of freedmen, 
including “the constitutional right to bear arms.”207 
 At nearly the same time, Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1866 
(applying nationally). Its sponsor, Senate Judiciary Chairman Lyman 
Trumbull also had written the Freedmen’s Bureau Bill.208 He explained that 
                                            
204 Heller at 614-16; McDonald at 561 U.S. 742, 771–81; 827–50 (Thomas, J., concurring) 
205 DAVID RABBAN, FREE SPEECH IN ITS FORGOTTEN YEARS, 1870-1920 (1999). For analysis 
of the poor jurisprudence and negative effects of Jim Crow gun control, see Robert J. Cottrol 
& Raymond T. Diamond, “Never Intended to be Applied to the White Population”: Firearms 
Regulation and Racial Disparity--The Redeemed South’s Legacy to a National Jurisprudence?, 
70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1307 (1995). 
206 See An Act prescribing additional penalties for the commission of offenses against the 
State and for other purposes, ch. 1,466, no. 3, § 12, 1865 Laws of Fla. 25, 27 (Dec. 18, 1865) 
(“[I]t shall not be lawful for any negro, mulatto, or other person of color, to own, use or keep in 
his possession or under his control, any Bowieknife, dirk, sword, fire-arms or ammunition of 
any kind.” Licenses could be issued by probate judges, based on “the recommendation of two 
respectable citizens of the county certifying the peaceful and orderly character of the 
applicant.” Punishment was forfeiture of the arms, along with 39 lashes or an hour in the 
pillory.); An Act to punish certain Offences therein named, and for other purposes, ch. 23, §1, 
1865 Miss. Laws 165, 165-66 (Nov. 29, 1865) (regular session) (requiring license from the 
county board of police); CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1838 (Apr. 7, 1866) (denouncing 
Alabama law forbidding arms possession by freedmen). 
207 14 Stat. 173 (1866), § 14. 
208 He sponsored the First Bill, which was vetoed. The Second Freedmen’s Bureau Bill was 
based on the first, and was enacted after Congress overrode President Johnson’s veto. 
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the Civil Rights Act would eradicate the anti-gun laws of the ex-
Confederacy.209 But the Civil Rights Act rested on constitutionally 
questionable grounds. Trumbull and others argued that it could be based on 
Congress’s enforcement power under section two of the Thirteenth 
Amendment; by this theory, Congress could enact any legislation “appropriate” 
to safeguard the full civil freedom of the freedmen.210 Since Trumbull himself 
had written the Thirteenth Amendment,211 this was not an implausible 
argument.  
However, U.S. Rep. Jonathan Bingham, who strongly favored the objectives 
of the Civil Rights Act, doubted that the Thirteenth Amendment provided a 
basis for enacting most of it.212 Shortly thereafter, Bingham  introduced the 
Fourteenth Amendment, in part to put the Civil Rights Act on a more secure 
constitutional footing.213 Ratification was completed in 1868, and Congress 
then reenacted the Civil Rights Act. But the first cases involving the Civil 
Rights Act arose before the Fourteenth Amendment had been ratified. 
In November 1866, the Mississippi High Court of Errors and Appeals ruled 
the Civil Rights Act of 1866 unconstitutional, in a case involving the state’s 
arms restrictions on freedmen. James Lewis, a former slave, had been 
convicted of carrying a firearm without a license from the county board of 
police—in violation of the 1865 gun control law for blacks.214 Pursuant to the 
statute, he was fined one dollar, and ordered to pay court costs. Being unable 
to afford to do so, he was jailed for five days, and would then be hired out as a 
servant to whomever would pay the fine and costs for him.215  
He appealed, and no brief was filed by the prosecutor. Nevertheless, the 
opinion by Chief Justice Handy upheld the conviction.216 Lewis had argued 
that, now being free, he was a citizen of Mississippi, and entitled to the right 
to bear arms guaranteed by the Mississippi Constitution.217 Chief Justice 
                                            
209 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 474–75 (Jan. 29, 1866). 
210 Id. at 475. 
211 MARK K. KRUG, LYMAN TRUMBULL: CONSERVATIVE RADICAL 218 (1965); RALPH J. ROSKE, 
HIS OWN COUNSEL: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF LYMAN TRUMBULL 106–07 (1979); HORACE WHITE, 
THE LIFE OF LYMAN TRUMBULL 227 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1913). 
212 CONG. GLOBE 1866, 1293. 
 213 For details on the repeatedly-expressed intent of Congress to use the Freedmen’s 
Bureau, the Civil Rights Act, and the Fourteenth Amendment to protect the Second 
Amendment rights of the freedmen, see, e.g, McDonald v. Chicago at 771–78; id. at 846–50 
(Thomas, J., concurring); STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, FREEDMEN, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT, 
AND THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS, 1866-1876 (1998) (cited in Heller at 614–15, and in McDonald 
at 771 n.18, 776, 780). 
214 An Act to punish certain Offences therein named, and for other purposes, ch. 23, §1, 
1865 Miss. Laws 165, 165-66 (Nov. 29, 1865) (regular session). 
215 Decision of Chief Justice Handy, Declaring the Civil Rights Bill Unconstitutional, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 26, 1866, at 2, col. 3. 
216 Even by Mississippi standards, Alexander H. Handy (1809–71) was an ardent and 
adamant secessionist. See JOHN RAY SKATES, A HISTORY OF THE MISSISSIPPI SUPREME 
COURT:1817-1948 (1972). 
217 “Every citizen has a right to bear arms in defence of himself and the State.” MISS. 
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Handy said that section one of the Thirteenth Amendment,218 which had 
liberated Lewis from slavery, did not change the practice which had existed in 
many non-slave states that “the African race, even when free, are essentially 
a degraded caste, of inferior rank and condition in society.”219 
Section two of the Thirteenth Amendment gave Congress “the power to 
enforce this article by appropriate legislation.”220 According to the Chief 
Justice, this gave Congress the power to act against the holding of people in 
slavery, but not to pass legislation regarding how ex-slaves were treated by the 
states. The Civil Rights Act had mandated that blacks must have “full and 
equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and property 
as are enjoyed by white citizens.”221 This would make Mississippi’s gun 
licensing law illegal. But the Civil Rights Act was unconstitutional, because 
Congress had no power to enact it, the Mississippi Court ruled.222 
The 1866 case was not the only time the Mississippi Court would take a 
hard line on gun control. In a later case, a Sheriff gave his pistol to a gunsmith, 
Strahan, for repair. After the repair was completed, Strahan put the pistol in 
his pocket, and delivered it to the Sheriff. The Mississippi Supreme Court 
upheld the conviction for violation of the concealed carry ban.223 
In 1883, in the Civil Rights Cases, the U.S. Supreme Court would rule that 
Section two of the Thirteenth Amendment authorizes Congress to abolish “all 
badges and incidents of slavery.”224 Since disarmament was an “incident” of 
slavery,225 this would allow Congress to act against disarmament laws. But by 
1883, Congress had lost any appetite for interfering with white supremacy in 
the ex-Confederacy. 
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through 1860). 
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B. United States v. Cruikshank 
After the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified in 1868, Congress re-enacted 
the Civil Rights Act. Congress also passed the Enforcement Act, providing 
criminal penalties for persons who attempted to deprive persons of their civil 
rights.226 As a result, there were federal criminal prosecutions of persons who 
had deprived freedmen of their Second Amendment rights.227  
But that came to an end in the 1876 Supreme Court case United States v. 
Cruikshank.228 William Cruikshank was among the leaders of a group of 
whites who attacked and slaughtered scores of blacks at the county courthouse 
in Colfax, Louisiana.229 The massacre resulted from a dispute about whether 
the white supremacist Democrats allied with Cruikshank, or the black and 
white Republicans who barricaded themselves in the courthouse would control 
the county government. The white Republicans were allowed to flee before the 
massacre began. The barricaded blacks were armed, but mostly with low-
quality short-range shotguns. Cruikshank and his followers attacked with 
high-quality, longer-range rifles.230  
When the criminal prosecution of Cruikshank and others for violations of 
the constitutional rights of the victims reached the Supreme Court, the Court 
stated that right recognized in the Second Amendment, as well as the First 
Amendment right of peaceable assembly, had pre-existed the Constitution.231 
Ergo, First and Second Amendment rights had not been created by the 
Constitution; they were simply protected by the Constitution against federal 
infringement. The Privileges or Immunities protected by section one of the 
Fourteenth Amendment were only those which had been actually created by 
the formation of a national government under the Constitution. (E.g., the right 
to U.S. consular protection when traveling in a foreign nation, the right to 
travel to Washington, D.C., to do business with the federal government.) 
                                            
226 “An act to enforce the rights of citizens of the United States to vote in the several states 
of this Union, and for other purposes,” 16 Stat. 140 (May 31, 1870). 
227 See McDonald at 837 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing Proceedings in the Ku Klux Trials 
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Hence, Congress’s enforcement power under section five of the Fourteenth 
Amendment could not be used to protect First and Second Amendment rights. 
Justice Thomas explained the consequences: 
 
Cruikshank’s holding that blacks could look only to state 
governments for protection of their right to keep and bear arms 
enabled private forces, often with the assistance of local 
governments, to subjugate the newly freed slaves and their 
descendants through a wave of private violence designed to drive 
blacks from the voting booth and force them into peonage, an 
effective return to slavery. Without federal enforcement of the 
inalienable right to keep and bear arms, these militias and mobs 
were tragically successful in waging a campaign of terror against 
the very people the Fourteenth Amendment had just made 
citizens.232 
 
Although Cruikshank is not as famous as the Slaughter-House Cases or the 
Civil Rights Cases, James Gray Pope argues that it is really the case which 
accomplished what the other cases are given credit (or blame) for. The idea 
that the Privilege or Immunities Clause does not protect the Bill of Rights was 
dicta in Slaughter-House, but was applied to the Bill of Rights in Cruikshank. 
The idea that the Fourteenth Amendment only applies to state action is 
attributed to the Civil Rights Cases, but it was announced years before in 
Cruikshank, as part of the holding.233 In terms of how Slaughter-House and 
Cruikshank have been understand by the last several generations of lawyers, 
Pope is correct. 
However, Gerald Magliocca argues that in the nineteenth century, neither 
the Supreme Court nor the bar understood Slaughter-House and Cruikshank 
as rejecting Privileges or Immunities incorporation of any and every item from 
the Bill of Rights. Rather, the broadly restrictive interpretation was created by 
the Supreme Court around 1900, in retrospective declarations about what 
Slaughter-House and Cruikshank had really meant.234 This helps explain why, 
notwithstanding Slaughter-House and Cruikshank, one of the greatest 
Supreme Court litigators of the century, Lyman Trumbull, would bring a 
Second Amendment case to the Supreme Court in 1886, as will be detailed 
infra. 
 
                                            
232 McDonald at 855–56. 
233 See James Gray Pope, Snubbed Landmark: Why United States v. Cruikshank (1876) 
Belongs at the Heart of the American Constitutional Canon, 49 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 385 
(2014). 
234 Gerald Magliocca, Why Did the Incorporation of the Bill of Rights Fail in the Late 
Nineteenth Century? 94 MINN. L. REV. 102 (2009). 
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C. Tennessee 
Tennessee, a border state, had acted speedily upon the April 1865 surrender 
of the Confederate States of America, and its representatives were soon back 
in the United States Congress. As a result, Tennessee escaped the military rule 
which was imposed on the other ex-confederate states. A new constitutional 
convention was held, and it declared all acts of the confederate state legislature 
null and void ab initio.235  
This led to Smith v. Ishenhour (Tenn. 1866).236 In 1861, Tennessee’s 
Confederate government had enacted a statute authorizing the seizure of 
citizen arms for use by the Confederate army.237 Acting under authority 
delegated by the state’s Confederate Governor, Smith had seized Ishenhour’s 
firearm in 1862.238  
After the war, Ishenhour sued Smith for trespass, for taking his gun. He 
won the case before a Justice of the Peace. The Tennessee Supreme Court had 
no trouble disposing of Smith’s appeal.239 Smith was personally liable, for 
although he had purported statutory authority, the statute was void. Besides 
that, the confiscation statute “utterly disregarded” the state constitution, and 
was “the first attempt, in the history of the Anglo-Saxon race, of which we are 
apprised, to disarm the people by legislation.”240 
But soon, the Tennessee legislature would resume its traditional role as the 
leading arms control legislature in the nation. Like other Southern state 
legislatures after 1868, Tennessee steered away from gun control laws which 
explicitly discriminated based on race. Provoking Congress would not be a good 
idea, and expressly racial gun control might run afoul of the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. So arms control laws were always 
racially neutral on paper, although in practice this was not always so. A Florida 
Supreme Court Justice, describing a gun control law enacted during Jim Crow, 
wrote that “The statute was never intended to be applied to the white 
population and in practice has never been so applied.”241 
                                            
235 Smith v. Ishenhour, 43 Tenn. (3 Cold.) 214, 217–18 (1866). 
236 Smith v. Ishenhour, 43 Tenn. (3 Cold.) 214 (1866). 
237 Id. at 216–17. 
238 Id. at 215. 
239 Id. at 215. 
 240 Id. at 217. The Court also could have cited the England’s 1671 Game Act, which was 
applied by Kings Charles II and James II with the purpose of disarming the population, thus 
preventing forcible resistance to their arbitrary rule, but eventually helping to cause the 
downfall of the Stuart line in the Glorious Revolution. MALCOLM; Heller at 612–13 (quoting 
Nunn at 251); text at note --- supra. 
241  
I know something of the history of this legislation. The original Act of 1893 was 
passed when there was a great influx of negro laborers in this State drawn 
here for the purpose of working in turpentine and lumber camps. The same 
condition existed when the Act was amended in 1901 and the Act was passed 
for the purpose of disarming the negro laborers and to thereby reduce the 
unlawful homicides that were prevalent in turpentine and saw-mill camps and 
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Andrews v. State (Tenn. 1871).242 In 1870, the Tennessee Legislature 
prohibited the carrying of “a dirk,243 sword-cane, Spanish stiletto,244 belt or 
pocket pistol or revolver,” either openly or concealed.245 The language about 
“belt or pocket pistol or revolver” covered many but not all handguns. 
The case known as Andrews v. State was a consolidated appeal of cases 
involving four defendants: Andrews, O’Toole, Custer, and Page. Andrews was 
convicted and appealed. O’Toole had been successful in quashing his 
indictment on the grounds that the statute was unconstitutional, so the 
prosecutor appealed. Custer was convicted, but the trial court refused to order 
him to post bond for good behavior (“surety for the peace”) and so the 
prosecutor appealed. Page was on one occasion “seen coming from his home 
along the big road, about a mile distant from his house, carrying in his hand, 
swinging by his side, a pistol called a revolver, about eight inches long,” and 
had threatened to perpetrate an assault, and was convicted.246 
All of the defendants had moved that their indictments be quashed on the 
grounds that the indictments had not specified what type of pistol was carried. 
None of these motions had prevailed. Andrews had wanted to introduce 
evidence “that there was a set of men in the neighborhood of defendant during 
the time he had carried his pistol, and before, seeking the life of defendant.”247 
                                            
to give the white citizens in sparsely settled areas a better feeling of security. 
The statute was never intended to be applied to the white population and in 
practice has never been so applied. We have no statistics available, but it is a 
safe guess that more than 80% of the white men living rural sections of Florida 
have violated this statute. It is also a safe guess to say that not more than 5% 
of the men in Florida who own pistols and repeating rifles have ever applied to 
the Board of County Commissioners for a permit to have the same in their 
possession and there has never been, within my knowledge, any effort to 
enforce the provisions of this statute as to white people, because it has been 
generally conceded to be in contravention of the Constitution and non-
enforceable if contested.  
 
Watson v. Stone, 4 So.2d 700, 703 (Fla. 1941) (Buford, J., concurring) (the case held that a 
handgun in an automobile glove compartment did not violate the statutory restriction on 
“carrying”). 
 242 Andrews v. State, 50 Tenn. (3 Heisk.) 165 (1871). 
 243 A knife with one cutting edge, originally created in Scotland; prohibited by Great 
Britain’s “Disarming Acts” of 1716 and 1725, in response to Scottish uprisings. HAROLD L. 
PETERSON, DAGGERS & FIGHTING KNIVES OF THE WESTERN WORLD 60 (1968); American Knife 
& Tool Institute, ATKI Approved Knife Definitions, http://www.akti.org/resources/akti-
approved-knife-definitions/#dirk  
 244 This apparently refers to thin-bladed Spanish knives which open automatically when a 
lever or button releases a spring. http://www.autoknife.info/Spanish_1.html. The American 
Tool and Knife Institute argues that the terms “dirk” and “stiletto” are unconstitutionally 
vague. ATKI Approved Knife Definitions, supra. 
 245 Andrews at 171. 
246 Id. at 201. 
247 Id. at 188. 
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This evidence had been properly refused, said the state Supreme Court, given 
the proof “that he had been in the habit of carrying a pistol since the war.”248 
The Tennessee Supreme Court ruled that all the first three indictments 
must be quashed, whereas Page’s conviction was affirmed.  
The ban on open public carry could not be applied to militia-suitable arms: 
“the rifle, of all descriptions, the shot gun, the musket and repeater.”249 The 
“repeater” was a “pistol” that “is a soldier’s weapon—skill in the use of which 
will add to the efficiency of the soldier. If such is the character of the weapon 
here designated, then the prohibition of the statute is too broad to be allowed 
to stand…”250 Further, the carry ban had the effect of prohibiting the carrying 
of a gun to places for target practice or for repair, both of which were 
constitutionally protected:  
 
The right to keep arms, necessarily involves the right to purchase 
them, to keep them in a state of efficiency for use, and to purchase 
and provide ammunition suitable for such arms, and to keep them 
in repair…. But farther than this, it must be held, that the right 
to keep arms involves, necessarily, the right to use such arms for 
all the ordinary purposes, and in all the ordinary modes usual in 
the country, and to which arms are adapted, limited by the duties 
of a good citizen in times of peace; that in such use, he shall not 
use them for violation of the rights of others, or the paramount 
rights of the community of which he makes a part.251 
 
In the twenty-first century, Andrews is one of the few post-war cases to 
stand as an important authority. Heller quoted the above language about “all 
the ordinary purposes” and “all the ordinary modes usual in the country,” 
subject to “the duties of a good citizen in times of peace.”252 Heller also cited 
Andrews for the principle that the Second Amendment is not only for 
militiamen.253 Finally, Heller pointed to the carry restriction in Andrews as 
one of the “[f]ew laws in our history” that approached the severity of the D.C. 
handgun ban, and noted with approval that the handgun carry ban in Andrews 
had been “struck down.”254 
                                            
248 Id. at 188. 
 249 Id. at 171. 
 250 Id. at 171. 
251 Id. at 178-79. 
252 Heller at 614. 
253 Heller at 609. 
254 Heller at 629. Justice Stevens also quoted language from Andrews stating that some 
arms (those that are not of the type for militia service) can be banned. McDonald v. Chicago 
at 937 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens said that Andrews “summarized the 
Reconstruction understanding of the states’ police power to regulate firearms.” Id. If that is 
true, the understanding is contrary to Justice Stevens’ view that Chicago can constitutionally 
ban all handguns, even in the home.  
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Post-Heller, Andrews has been cited by the Sixth Circuit in upholding a 
sentence enhancement of using a gun in a crime,255 by the Ninth Circuit in 
striking down a near-total prohibition on defensive handgun carrying,256 and 
by the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California in striking 
down unreasonable delays on the purchase of firearms.257 It has been miscited 
by some courts as purported authority for statutes making in nearly impossible 
for citizens to carry handguns for lawful protection.258 The Second Circuit put 
Andrews in a list of cases where severe restrictions on the right to carry 
“withstood constitutional challenges.”259 The passage does not create 
confidence that the author read Andrews or Heller carefully. 
State v. Wilburn (Tenn. 1872).260 The Tennessee legislature responded 
promptly to Andrews. A new statute banned carrying any handgun “other than 
an army pistol, or such as are commonly carried and used in the United States 
army.”261 This was the narrowest reading possible of the Aymette-Andrews 
“civilized warfare” rule that only militia-suitable arms were constitutionally 
protected. The obvious effect was that the military handguns owned by ex-
confederate officers and ex-cavalrymen (likely to be wealthier, since 
cavalrymen typically had to supply their own horse) were protected, whereas 
the smaller, less expensive handguns which might be owned by freedmen were 
not. 
However, the statute also did its best to constrain all carry: “in no case shall 
it be lawful for any person to carry such army pistol publicly or privately about 
his person in any other manner than openly in his hands...”262 
To say the least, requiring that gun carriers must carry in the hand is 
extremely dangerous. Especially in a period when many handguns did not have 
safeties or trigger guards, the potential to cause accidents was enormous. The 
inconvenience of this mode of carry was obviously designed to discourage 
carrying.  
There is a pattern in some post-bellum Southern Supreme Courts of 
attempting to enforce constitutional rights, and then giving up under incessant 
pressure of the legislature. One good example is the Alabama Supreme Court, 
which three times relied on the federal Civil Rights Act (protecting the right to 
contract) to strike down state statutes against inter-racial marriage. But after 
                                            
255 United States v. Greeno, 679 F.3d 510, 520 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting the concurring 
opinion that (“Neither the old [1796] nor the new [1870 state] Constitution confers the right to 
keep, or to bear, or to wear arms, for the purpose of aggression.”) (brackets added). 
256 Peruta v. County of San Diego, 742 F.3d 1144, 1157 (9th Cir. 2014), reh’g en banc 
granted, 781 F.3d 1106 (9th Cir. 2015). Because en banc review was granted, the Peruta 
decision has been vacated. Id. Peruta and Greeno both examine many of the nineteenth century 
cases carefully. 
257 Silvester v. Harris, 41 F.Supp.3d 927, 962 (E.D. Calif. 2014). 
258 See In re Wheeler, 81 A.3d 728, 758 (N.J. Super. A.D. 2013). 
259 Kachalsky v. County of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 90–91 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 260 State v. Wilburn, 66 Tenn. (7 Baxt.) 57 (1872). 
261 Id. at 61. 
262 Id. at 61. 
42 
 
the Indiana Supreme Court upheld an Indiana law on the same subject (on the 
theory that marriage is “status,” not “contract”), the Alabama Supreme Court 
gave up, and its fourth case finally allowed Alabama’s statute against inter-
racial marriage to stand.263 
The Tennessee Supreme Court was less resilient, giving up after only one 
time. The Wilburn decision unanimously upheld the abrogation for almost all 
practical purposes of the right to carry a handgun.264 
It had only taken a few decades for Tennessee to go all the way down the 
slippery slope. The 1837 statute merely forbade carrying a concealed bowie 
knife, but by 1872 it was illegal to carry any handgun, except that a person 
could carry an expensive and large handgun in a manner that no prudent 
person would want to. The results would not have surprised the Kentucky 
Supreme Court which had decided Bliss v. Commonwealth in 1822; an allowed 
infringement of part of the right may eventually lead to the destruction of the 
right. 
A few years later, in State v. Callicutt, the Tennessee Court upheld an 1856 
statute making it illegal to sell or loan pistols or other dangerous weapons to 
minors.265 The statute had an exception for hunting and for self-defense when 
traveling.266 The Court opined that there was no right to carry arms for self-
defense; rather, defensive carry was “justly branded as a crime that ought to 
be suppressed.”267 That aspect of the Callicutt opinion is not followed today, 
but courts have cited Callicutt as an example of “longstanding” restrictions on 
minors acquiring arms.268 
State v. Burgoyne (Tenn. 1881).269 Having previously disposed of handgun 
carry, the Tennessee legislature in 1879 outlawed the sale of all handguns 
“except army or navy pistols.”270  
Burgoyne was the first firearms businessmen to be a party in a right to 
arms case. He was a licensed merchant in Memphis. Burgoyne had an active 
merchant’s license when the sales ban went into effect on March 17, 1879. He 
continued to sell pistols, some of them not “army or navy,” afterwards. Later, 
his merchant’s license expired, and he acquired a second license. He continued 
to sell the inventory of arms which he had acquired before March 17.271 
                                            
263 PEGGY PASCOE, WHAT COMES NATURALLY: MISCEGENATION LAW AND THE MAKING OF 
RACE IN AMERICA (2010).  
264 Wilburn at 62–63. 
265 State v. Callicutt, 69 Tenn. 714 (1878). 
266 1855–56 Tenn. Acts 92 (Feb. 26, 1856). 
267 Callicutt at 716. 
268 National Rifle Ass’n of America, Inc. v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and 
Explosives, 700 F.3d 185, 203 (5th Cir. 2012); United States v. Rene E., 583 F.3d 8, 14–15 (1st 
Cir. 2009). 
 269 State v. Burgoyne, 75 Tenn. (7 Lea) 173 (Tenn. 1881). 
270 Id. at 173–74. 
271 Id. at 174. 
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The Tennessee Supreme Court ruled that the gun ban was constitutional, 
since it would help reduce the carrying of concealed handguns, which had been 
recognized as a constitutional purpose.272 
However, there was a separate constitutional problem: the unreasonable 
interference with Burgoyne’s sale of goods which he had lawfully acquired. The 
court ruled that the exception provided by the legislature was sufficient: 
merchants with handguns could continue to sell handgun inventory acquired 
before the ban, until their current license expired. So Burgoyne’s handgun 
sales under the first license were legal, but his sales under the second license 
were illegal. His fine was affirmed.273 
As Burgoyne demonstrates, not everything which is historic is 
constitutional.274 This is particularly so for Jim Crow precedents restricting 
enumerated rights. 
 
D. Arkansas 
Fife v. State (1876).275 Tennessee’s greatest competitor as gun control 
exemplar was Arkansas. There too, the state supreme court eventually acceded 
to the state legislature’s efforts to extirpate lawful handgun carry. 
The 1874 election was the first in which former Arkansas Confederates 
were allowed to vote. They elected huge Democratic majorities, and ended 
Reconstruction in the state.276 In February 1875, the new state legislature 
enacted a statute against carrying concealed arms.277 On September 17, 1875, 
a witness saw Alfred Fife on a street in Pine Bluff, “in company with one Terry, 
near Trulock’s bank.”278 Fife “had a banjo under his left arm, and a pistol in 
his hand.”279 
The witness spoke to Fife’s companion, Terry.280 Whereupon Fife “raised 
his pistol” and asked Terry what the witness had said to Terry.281 The  
 
                                            
272 Id. at 175–76. 
273 Id. at 176–79. 
274 Burgoyne was cited by the Illinois Supreme Court in 1917 for the proposition that “the 
sale of deadly weapons may be absolutely prohibited,” and that prohibition in no way conflicts 
with the constitutional right to arms. Biffer v. City of Chicago, 278 Ill. 562, 569, 116 N.E. 182, 
185 (1917). 
 275 Fife v. State, 31 Ark. 455 (1876). 
 276 Civil War through Reconstruction, 1861 through 1874, THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ARKANSAS 
HISTORY & CULTURE (Butler Center for Arkansas Studies, Central Arkansas Library System), 
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[w]itness replied that he was talking to Terry. [Fife]282 laid the 
guard of his pistol, which he held in his hand, against the face of 
witness, and said that, meaning the pistol, ruled the world, to 
which witness replied: ‘Yes, it did.’ Witness saw the pistol, and 
thought it was a revolver. 
On the same day, perhaps, another witness saw plaintiff in a 
drug store, with a pistol in his hand. He did not notice it 
particularly, but thought it was a revolver. 
On the evening of the same day, [Fife] was playing cards in a 
saloon, when an intoxicated man came in, and [Fife] undertook to 
put him out. They clenched and fell behind a screen. After the 
difficulty was over, the saloon keeper found on the floor the 
cylinder of a pistol, but he saw [Fife] with no pistol.283 
 
The Supreme Court reasonably concluded “It is probable, from all the 
evidence, that [Fife] was carrying a pocket revolver.”284 The state statute 
banned “carrying, as a weapon, ‘any pistol of any kind whatever,’ with 
provisions for exceptional cases.”285 
Fife was convicted by a jury, and the Arkansas Supreme Court rejected his 
argument that the concealed carry statute was unconstitutional. The Arkansas 
court hewed closely to and quoted extensively from Tennessee’s Andrews v. 
State.286 Reading the Arkansas statute narrowly, the Court found that it 
applied to “the pistol intended to be proscribed is such as is usually carried in 
the pocket, or of a size to be concealed about the person, and used in private 
quarrels and brawls, and not such as is in ordinary use, and effective as a 
weapon of war, and useful and necessary for ‘the common defense.’”287  
After quoting Andrews’ listing of constitutionally protected arms, Fife 
explained that the “repeater” pistol meant “the army and navy repeaters, 
which, in recent warfare, have very generally superseded the old-fashioned 
holster, used as a weapon in the battles of our forefathers.”288 The “pocket 
revolver” that Fife had been carrying was not a military handgun, so Fife’s 
conviction was upheld. 
                                            
 282 In the block quote here, the court refers to Fife as “Plaintiff.” Fife was, in the 
terminology of the day, the “plaintiff-in-error,” because he was bringing a case in which he 
alleged a lower court had made an error. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1035 (5th ed. 1979). 
283 Fife, 31 Ark. at 456. 
284 Id. 
285 Id. 
 286 Id. 
287 Id. at 461. 
288 Id. at 460–61. The Fife court suggested that Andrews’ examples of some of the arms 
which are constitutionally protected should have included “the sword, though not such as are 
concealed in a cane.” Id. 
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As was typical in states with carry restrictions, Arkansas had exceptions 
for persons on their own premises or on a journey.289  
Wilson v. State (Ark. 1878)290 straightforwardly followed Fife and Andrews. 
The trial court had excluded evidence that Chancy Wilson borrowed “a large 
army size six shooter, a revolving pistol, 44 caliber, eight inches in the barrel, 
such as is commonly used in warfare.”291 He said that 
 
he was going over to Pearman’s to shoot wild hogs. On the next 
day he went to Pearman’s, stated to him the purpose of his visit, 
and while conversing with him, before going into dinner, pulled 
the pistol out of his boot, cocked it a few times to see if it would 
revolve, and then put it around under his coat, and went in to 
dinner.292 
 
The Supreme Court held that individuals had a right to openly carry army-
quality handguns in public. Wilson had the right to a jury instruction, which 
had been refused at trial, “that if they believed from the evidence, that the 
pistol carried by him was an army size pistol, such as are commonly used in 
warfare, they should acquit.”293 “[T]o prohibit the citizen from wearing or 
carrying a war arm….is an unwarranted restriction upon his constitutional 
                                            
289 State v. Wardlaw, 43 Ark. 73, 74 (1884). Wardlaw found a derringer to be within the 
scope of the carry ban. Id. at 74. The statute should not be implied to require that the gun 
must be loaded, for this is “a fact which can hardly ever be ascertained beyond peradventure.” 
Id. at 74–75. This was true for old-fashioned muzzle-loading guns which were still common in 
1884. It is not true for modern breech-loading firearms; for them, it is easy to open the gun and 
examine the firing chamber. 
For more on the journey exception, see John Thomas Shepherd, Comment, Who is the 
Arkansas Traveler?: Analyzing Arkansas’s “Journey” Exception to the Offense of Carrying a 
Weapon, 66 Ark. L. Rev. 463 (2013) (also examining similar exemptions in Mississippi, 
Missouri, and Texas). The Arkansas nineteenth century courts applied the “journey” exception 
liberally, whenever a person traveled beyond his “circle of neighbors.” Shepherd, at 468–71. 
Texas did not adopt the “circle of neighbors” test, and its jurisprudence on the meaning of “a 
person who is traveling” has long been confusing. See Jack Skaggs, Comment, Have Gun, Will 
Travel? The Hopelessly Confusing Journey of the Traveling Exception to the Unlawful Carrying 
Weapons Statute, 57 BAYLOR L. REV. 507 (2005). The Texas problem was mostly solved in 2007 
by legislation specifying that a carry permit is not necessary for carrying a handgun in an 
automobile. TEX. PENAL CODE §46.02; Motorist Protection Act, HB1815 (2007). 
 290 Wilson v. State, 33 Ark. 557 (1878). Along with Andrews and Fife, Wilson was cited by 
the dissent in Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 451 (3d Cir. 2013) (Hardiman, J., dissenting) 
(arguing that New Jersey’s refusal to issue carry permits except in rare circumstances violates 
the Second Amendment). 
291 Wilson, 33 Ark. at 559. 
292 Id. 
293 Id. 
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right to keep and bear arms.” 294 The conviction was reversed and the case 
remanded for a new trial.295 
Holland v. State (Ark. 1878).296 Also in 1878, the Arkansas Supreme Court 
reversed and remanded the conviction of James Holland. On October 1, 1875, 
a witness saw Holland riding a horse, with two guns in the saddlebags—a navy 
size Remington, and “a Colt’s army pistol.”297 Holland said he was from 
Texas.298 The trial court erred by refusing to give Holland’s requested 
instruction “that if they found from the evidence that the pistols, proven to 
have been carried, were army sized pistols, and were such as are commonly 
used in the United States military and naval service, they must acquit 
defendant.”299 So the case was remanded for a new trial.300 
In Fife, Wilson, and Holland, the Arkansas Supreme Court had protected 
the right to carry, at least for large handguns openly carried. But the judicial 
will to resist would soon wane.  
Haile v. State (Ark. 1882).301 In 1881 the Arkansas legislature copied the 
1872 Tennessee statute which outlawed “the carrying of army pistols except 
uncovered and in the hand.”302 In the trial court, the parties agreed on all the 
facts: On Sept. 26, 1881, Haile had carried openly “and buckled around his 
waist…a large revolving pistol, known as the Colts army pistol.”303 He was not 
within the scope of any of the statutory exemptions, since he was not an army 
officer or carrying under the direction thereof; “he was not upon a journey, nor 
upon his own premises.”304 
He appealed after being fined 50 dollars.305 Yet he did not submit a brief on 
appeal.306 The court reached out to address the constitutional issue, for “we 
suppose his exceptions refer to the validity of the act as unconstitutional.”307 
Citing Tennessee’s Wilburn decision upholding a similar statute, the Arkansas 
court affirmed Haile’s conviction, while insisting “The constitutional right is a 
very valuable one. We would not disparage it.”308 
                                            
294 Id. at 560. “If cowardly and dishonorable men sometimes shoot unarmed men with army 
pistols or guns, the evil must be prevented by the penitentiary and gallows, and not by a 
general deprivation of a constitutional privilege.” Id. 
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Dabbs v. State (Ark. 1885).309 Arkansas in 1881 also enacted a copy of the 
1879 Tennessee ban on the sale of all handguns, except those “used in the army 
or navy of the United States and known as the navy pistol.”310 Dabbs pleaded 
guilty to selling a pocket pistol, and the court assessed a fine. Dabbs then 
“moved in arrest of judgment.”311 
On appeal, the Attorney General took a hard line: “The right to ‘keep and 
bear arms’ may be absolutely prohibited.”312 The Arkansas Supreme Court did 
not go that far, but it did uphold Dabbs’s conviction and the statute, since it 
did not ban arms which are “useful in warfare.”313 Neither Haile nor Dabbs 
have been cited by any post-Heller court. 
E. Texas 
English v. State (Tex. 1872).314 An 1871 statute forbade the open or 
concealed carrying of handguns and a variety of edged weapons under most 
circumstances.315 The Texas Supreme Court analyzed the law in the context of 
three combined appeals.  
English was intoxicated when a witness saw him with a pistol. The pistol 
was unloaded and inoperable. He was taking “it along with him to have it 
mended.”316 Daniels had gone “into a religious assembly.”317 There, witnesses 
had seen “the handle of a butcher knife was sticking out above the waistband 
of his breeches, and between the skirts of his frock coat.”318 There was “[n]o 
transcript in Carter’s case.”319 Neither Daniels nor Carter filed a brief.  
The court upheld the convictions of English, Daniels, and Carter. The court 
said that the right to arms was only for weapons of war, and that laws against 
concealed carry were constitutional. The court did not inquire as to whether 
English’s pistol was or was not the type that was constitutionally protected. 
The Court thought that Texans had bad habits with guns, and explained 
the cause: Texas’s unusual and unfortunate legal and cultural heritage from 
                                            
 309 Dabbs v. State, 39 Ark. 353 (1882). 
 310 General Pistol Act of 1881. 
311 Dabbs at 355. 
312 Id. 
 313   
The law was enacted as a measure of precaution for the prevention of crimes 
and calamities. It is leveled at the pernicious habit of wearing such dangerous 
or deadly weapons as are easily concealed about the person. It does not abridge 
the constitutional right of citizens to keep and bear arms for the common 
defense; for it in no wise restrains the use or sale of such arms as are useful in 
warfare. 
 
Id. at 356–57. 
 314 English v. State, 35 Tex. 473 (1872). 
 315 Act to regulate the keeping and bearing of deadly weapons (Apr. 11, 1871). 
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317 Id. at 473–74. 
318 Id. at 474. 
319 Id. 
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Spain.320 Spain, in turn, was said by the court to have a mixture of 
Carthaginian, Visigoth, Arab, and other influences.321 The court looked to the 
new gun control statute as a salutary example of the Spanish influence being 
displaced by “the sound philosophy and pure morality of the common law.”322 
The state’s founding traditions of liberty were rejected: “We will not say to 
what extent the early customs and habits of the people of this state should be 
respected and accommodated, where they may come in conflict with the ideas 
of intelligent and well-meaning legislators.”323 
As to what the right to arms protected, English said it was those “as are 
used for purposes of war,” such as “musket and bayonet…the sabre, holster 
pistols and carbine…the field piece, siege gun, and mortar, with side arms.”324 
These were contrasted with “dirks, daggers, slungshots, sword-canes, brass-
knuckles and bowie knives,” which were “employed in quarrels and broils, and 
fights between maddened individuals.”325 In support of the distinction, English 
pointed out that “Blackstone says, the offense of riding or going around with 
dangerous or unusual weapons is a crime against the public peace, by 
terrifying the good people of the land.”326 
English is cited in Heller as an illustration of what Heller calls “the 
historical tradition of prohibiting the carrying of ‘dangerous and unusual 
weapons.’”327 Heller also cited three other cases which had the “dangerous and 
unusual” language, although these were terse, fact-bound cases which just 
contained the quote about the common law crime, and did not analyze or 
mention the right to arms.328 
                                            
320 Id. at 480. 
321 Id. 
 322 English, at 480. 
323 Id. 
324 English at 475. 
325 English at 475. A “slungshot” is not the same as a “slingshot.” The former is a cord with 
a loop in the middle, and weighted balls at each end; it is a maritime tool, used for casting 
lines. See GEORGE CAMERON STONE, A GLOSSARY OF THE CONSTRUCTION, DECORATION AND USE 
OF ARMS AND ARMOR 568 (Dover Mil. Hist. 1999) (1934). 
326 Id. 
327 Heller at 627. 
English is also cited by Justice Stevens’ dissent in McDonald, as “observing that ‘almost, 
if not every one of the States of this Union have [a prohibition on the carrying of deadly 
weapons] upon their statute books,” and lambasting claims of a right to carry such weapons as 
“little short of ridiculous.” McDonald at 888 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing English at 478–
79). This overlooks the fact that except in some ex-Confederate states, the carry laws were 
non-prohibitive, applying only to carrying in a concealed or terrifying manner.  
328 Heller at 627, citing State v. Langford, 10 N.C. 381, 383–84 (1824); O’Neill v. State, 16 
Ala. 65, 67 (1849); English v. State, 35 Tex. 473, 476 (1871); State v. Lanier, 71 N.C. 288, 289 
(1874). 
In Langford, there had clearly been a breach of the peace because “These men were armed 
with guns, which they fired at the house of an unprotected female, thus exciting her alarm for 
the safety of her person and her property.” 10 N.C. at 383. However, the court also discussed 
the general meaning of “affray”: “it seems certain there may be an affray when there is no 
actual violence: as when a man arms himself with dangerous and unusual weapons, in such a 
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While Heller adopted English’s “dangerous and unusual” general rule, 
Heller did not adopt English’s warfare-based test of which arms were protected 
or excluded by the rule. Heller makes no distinction between concealable 
pistols (unprotected under English) versus larger “holster pistols” (protected 
under English). 
State v. Duke (Tex. 1875).329 George Duke was indicted under the charge 
that on Dec. 23, 1871 he did “unlawfully carry on his person one pistol, known 
as a six-shooter.”330  
The court said that citizens had a right to own “such arms as are commonly 
kept, according to the customs of the people, and are appropriate for open and 
manly use in self-defense, as well as such as are proper for the defense of the 
State.”331 This included “the double-barreled shot-gun, the huntsman’s rifle, 
and such pistols at least as are not adapted to being carried concealed,” and 
“beyond question, the dragoon or holster pistol.”332  
As for carrying in public, Duke found that near-prohibition was “a 
legitimate and highly proper regulation of their use.”333 The carry law merely 
served to “regulate the place where, and the circumstances under which, a 
pistol may be carried.”334 The statute had exceptions for “certain officers in 
actual service, and any one having reasonable grounds to fear an attack.”335 
The district court had ruled that indictment was defective because it failed 
to allege that English was not protected by either of the statutory exemptions 
(military service or reasonable grounds to fear an attack). The State had 
appealed, and English had filed no brief on appeal. Even so, the Supreme Court 
affirmed the district court’s ruling against the form of the indictment. The 
Supreme Court emphasized that based on the particular form of the “loosely 
drawn statute,” a lawful indictment must negate the exceptions.336 
                                            
manner as will naturally cause a terror to the people.” Id. 
O’Neill held that “mere words” of “vulgar or low abuse” did not constitute an affray. 16 Ala. 
at 67. The court contrasted this with the rule that “if persons arm themselves with deadly or 
unusual weapons for the purpose of an affray, and in such manner as to strike terror to the 
people, they may be guilty of this offence, without coming to actual blows.” Id. 
Lanier relied on Huntley, supra text at notes ---, to state that “the offence of going armed 
with dangerous or unusual weapons is a crime against the public peace by terrifying the good 
people of the land.” Id. at 289. While unarmed and laughing, Lanier had cantered his horse 
through the courthouse, well after the court had adjourned for the day. The Lanier court said 
that whether this constituted the aforesaid crime, “within the spirit of this offence,” should be 
left to the jury. Id. 
 329 State v. Duke, 42 Tex. 455 (1875). 
330 Id. at 456. 
331 Id. at 459. 
 332 Id. A “dragoon” is a cavalry revolver. 
333 Id. 
334 Id. 
335 Id. at 460. 
336 Id. at 459–62. Although the indictment must negative the exceptions, the prosecutor 
was not required to prove the negatives at trial. Leatherwood v. State, 6 Tex. App. 244, 247 
(1879). Cf. Woodward v. State, 5 Tex. App. 296 (1878) (indictment had not negated the traveler 
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Jennings v. State, (Tex. 1878).337 Jennings was convicted of concealed carry, 
a misdemeanor. He did not appeal the conviction, but he did appeal the county 
court’s order, pursuant to state statute, that his gun be forfeited. The 
intermediate court of appeals agreed:  
 
While [the legislature] has the power to regulate the wearing of 
arms, it has not the power by legislation to take a citizen’s arms 
away from him. One of his most sacred rights is that of having 
arms for his own defence and that of the State. This right is one 
of the surest safeguards of liberty and self-preservation.338  
 
The forfeiture was reversed.339 
F. Georgia 
State v. Hill (Ga. 1874).340 Miles Hill was indicted for violating a statute 
against going to a court of justice while carrying weapons. The Georgia 
Supreme Court grudgingly acknowledged that the Nunn precedent protected 
the general right to carry handguns. However, there was another right which 
was equally important: 
 
the right to go into a court-house and peacefully and safely seek 
its privileges, is just as sacred as the right to carry arms, and if 
the temple of justice is turned into a barracks, and a visitor to it 
is compelled to mingle in a crowd of men loaded down with pistols 
and Bowie-knives, or bristling with guns and bayonets, his right 
of free access to the courts is just as much restricted as is the right 
to bear arms infringed by prohibiting the practice before courts of 
justice.341 
 
In 2012, the Eleventh Circuit used similar reasoning in rejecting a lawsuit 
claiming that plaintiffs had a right to carry firearms in churches, regardless of 
whether a particular church wanted them to.342 Churches’ right to control their 
own property was just as fundamental and traditional as plaintiffs’ right to 
bear arms.343 
                                            
exception, but this was harmless, because Woodward carried the gun in his hand, rather than 
in baggage, as travelers would do). 
Arkansas held that the exceptions need not be negated in the indictment. See Walker v. 
State, 35 Ark. 386, 388 (1880).  
 337 Jennings v. State, 5 Tex. App. 298 (1878). 
338 Id. at 300–01. 
339 Id. at 301. 
 340 State v. Hill, 53 Ga. 472 (1874). 
 341 Id. at 477–78. The Hill court did not cite the Statute of Northampton, but that statute 
was created in large part because of armed interference with the courts. See text at ---- supra. 
342 GeorgiaCarry.Org v. Georgia, 687 F.3d 1244 (11th Cir. 2012). 
343 Id. at 1264–65. 
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 The U.S. Supreme Court in Heller stated that among the “longstanding” 
gun controls which were “presumptively lawful” were bans on carrying guns in 
“sensitive places, such as schools and government buildings.”344 Hill and the 
statute it upheld are early examples of the sensitive places doctrine.  
G. Pennsylvania 
North of the Mason-Dixon Line, gun control was less popular, so there were 
consequently few non-Southern cases interpreting whether a particular law 
infringed the right to arms.345 One exception was the 1874 Wright v. 
                                            
344 Heller at 626–27. 
345 A recent article exaggerates the scope of gun control in the nineteenth-century North. 
See Eric M. Ruben & Saul Cornell, Firearm Regionalism and Public Carry: Placing Southern 
Antebellum Case Law in Context, 125 YALE L.J. FORUM 121 (2015). For example, the authors 
point to an 1836 Massachusetts statute that authors call a “broad regulation of public carry.” 
The Massachusetts model was copied by several non-Southern states. Id.  
Actually, the Massachusetts statute required that if a gun carrier gave someone 
“reasonable cause to fear an injury, or breach of the peace” and the gun carrier himself did not 
have “reasonable cause to fear an assault,” then the gun carrier could be required to post a 
bond for good behavior. 1836 Mass. Acts 750 (“If any person shall go armed with a dirk, dagger, 
sword, pistol, or other offensive and dangerous weapon, without reasonable cause to fear an 
assault or other injury, or violence to his person, or to his family or property, he may, on 
complaint of any person having reasonable cause to fear an injury, or breach of the peace, be 
required to find sureties for keeping the peace . . . .”). The Massachusetts statute imposed a 
reasonable requirement on persons whose conduct has already given “reasonable cause” for 
concern that they would misuse the gun. It is a not a restriction on peaceable behavior.  
Ruben and Cornell analogize the Massachusetts law to the Texas anti-carry law, discussed 
infra. Ruben & Cornell at 133. But they overlook the difference between permissive regulation 
and prohibition. Both statutes used similar language, in that they applied to a person who 
carried in public and who did not have reasonable cause to fear an assault. In Texas, that was 
the end of the matter; the person who carried would be criminally punished. In Massachusetts, 
nothing would happen; the carrying could take place in the plain view of a law enforcement 
officer, and no arrest could be made. 
Instead, Massachusetts provided a system to rein in gun carriers whose individual 
behavior made them appear threatening. If a private citizen could prove in court that the 
behavior of the gun carrier created “reasonable cause to fear an injury, or breach of the peace,” 
then the gun carrier could be required to post a bond for that he would cause unlawful injury 
or breach of the peace. Having posted the bond, he could go on carrying. The Massachusetts 
system demonstrated one way to leave the citizenry at liberty to carry, while imposing a 
reasonable regulation on individuals whose behavior was proven to be worrisome. As 
Chancellor Kent explained, “the personal security of every citizen is protected from lawless 
violence” not only by the penal code, but also by “the preventive arm of the magistrate, as a 
further protection from threatened or impending danger; and on reasonable cause being 
shown, he may require his adversary to be bound to keep the peace.” JAMES KENT, 1 
COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW *15–16 (8th ed., N.Y., William Kent 1854). 
Ruben and Cornell follow Patrick Charles in asserting that the Statute of Northampton, 
by its own force, prohibited peaceable carry in early America. As explained above, this 
interpretation is implausible for the Statute of Northampton itself (especially following Sir 
John Knight’s Case), and lacks any support in American statutes or case law related to the 
Statute of Northampton. See text at notes ------ infra. Ruben and Cornell cite various early 
American sources for prohibitions on going armed offensively, although these citations do 
nothing to support the notion that peaceable carry was illegal. Ruben & Cornell at 129–30. 
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Commonwealth.346 Pennsylvania had not banned the peaceful carry of 
concealed arms but had made it a crime to carry concealed with intent 
“unlawfully and maliciously, to do bodily harm to some other person.”347  
Jonathan Wright was tried for this offense, and the jury acquitted him. But 
the jury ruled he still had to pay the costs of the case. He appealed the costs, 
and also argued that the statute was unconstitutional. 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejected the constitutionality argument: 
carrying a gun with intent to unlawfully and maliciously injure someone was 
obviously not part of the right to arms.348 As for the costs, “[w]e must presume 
the jury had a good reason for doing so, arising in the conduct of the 
defendant.”349 
 
                                            
Indeed, the notion that early Americans would have considered the sight of someone 
peaceably carrying a firearm to be inherent terrifying is contradicted by the many early 
American statutes which required firearms carrying in many non-militia situations, such as 
while going to or from church, or traveling more than a short distance from one’s home. See, 
e.g., WILLIAM WALLER HENING, 1 THE STATUTES AT LARGE; BEING A COLLECTION OF ALL THE 
LAWS OF VIRGINIA, FROM THE FIRST SESSION OF THE LEGISLATURE, IN THE YEAR 1619, at 198 
(1823) (1632 statute that ‘All men that are fittinge to beare arms, shall bring their pieces to 
the church.’’); id. at 127, 198 (while working the ground; or whenever one shall “go or send 
abroad”; enacted 1632); 1 PUBLIC RECORDS OF CONNECTICUT 95–96 (enacted 1643) (going to or 
from church); NATHANIEL B. SHURTLEFF, 1 RECORDS OF THE GOVERNOR AND COMPANY OF THE 
MASSACHUSETTS BAY IN NEW ENGLAND 85 (1853) (when traveling more than one mile from 
dwelling houses); 1 RECORDS OF THE COLONY OF RHODE ISLAND AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS, 
IN NEW ENGLAND 94 (John Russell Bartlett ed., 1856) (traveling more than two miles from 
town, or attending any public meeting); 3 ARCHIVES OF MARYLAND 103 (J. Hall Pleasants ed., 
1935) (enacted 1642) (church meetings, travel); DAVID J. MCCORD, 7 STATUTES AT LARGE OF 
SOUTH CAROLINA 417–19 (1840) (churches or other public religious meetings); 19 (part 1) THE 
COLONIAL RECORDS OF THE STATE OF GEORGIA 137–40 (Allen D. Candler ed., 1904) (enacted 
1770) (same as South Carolina). 
Thus, it is not surprising that criminal justice offer manuals from early America contain 
no instruction to arrest people for peaceably carrying arms. See ISAAC GOODWIN, NEW 
ENGLAND SHERIFF (Worcester, Dorr & Howland 1830); CHARLES W. HARTSHORN, NEW 
ENGLAND SHERIFF (Worcester, Warren Lazell 1844); JOHN MILTON NILES, THE CONNECTICUT 
CIVIL OFFICER tford, Huntington & Hopkins 1823); JOHN H.B. LATROBE, THE JUSTICES’ 
PRACTICE UNDER THE LAWS OF MARYLAND: INCLUDING THE DUTIES OF A CONSTABLE 22 
(Baltimore, Fielding Lucas, Jr. 1826); HENRY POTTER, THE OFFICE AND DUTY OF A JUSTICE OF 
THE PEACE…ACCORDING TO THE LAWS OF NORTH CAROLINA 243–44 (Raleigh, Joseph Gales 
1816). 
   
For a general critique of historian Cornell’s claims about legal doctrine, see Brief Amicus 
Curiae of Professors of Law, History, Politics, and Government In Support of Plaintiffs-
Appellees and in Support of Affirmance, 2012 WL 3164535, in Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 
865 (4th Cir. 2013). 
 346 Wright v. Commonwealth, 77 Pa. St. 470 (1875). 
347 Id. at 470. 
 348 Id. at 471. 
 349 Id. at 471. 
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H. Missouri 
State v. Wilforth (Mo. 1881).350 Like several state constitutions, Missouri’s 
right to arms had an express exception for carrying concealed weapons.351 
Wilforth had gone to a church house which was hosting a school exhibition “for 
literary purposes.”352 At the event, Wilforth carried “about his person fire-
arms.”353 This violated the state statute carrying any deadly weapon into “any 
school room, or place where people are assembled for educational, literary, or 
social purposes, or to any election precinct on election day….” Wilforth 
appealed his conviction for illegal carry but did not file a brief on appeal.  
Below, he had asked for jury instructions that they should acquit “if they 
believed defendant carried the pistol for the purpose of trade, or went into the 
house where the exhibition was going on having reasonable cause to believe 
that he would be in danger of bodily harm.”354 The Supreme Court ruled that 
the proposed jury instructions were properly refused because “there was not a 
scintilla of evidence upon which to base them.”355 
Wilforth is another early ancestor of the Supreme Court Heller rule 
allowing carry prohibition “in sensitive places, such as schools and government 
buildings.”356 
State v. Shelby (Mo. 1886).357 Shelby was staying at the Palace Hotel in the 
city of Gallatin when he “took a pistol from his coat pocket, where it was 
concealed, and laid it upon his lap while seated at the table in the dining-room, 
and that at the time the defendant was under the influence of intoxicating 
                                            
 350 State v. Wilforth, 74 Mo. 528 (1881). 
351 Under the 1875 Constitution: “That the right of no citizen to keep and bear arms in 
defense of his home, person and property, or in aid of the civil power, when thereto legally 
summoned, shall be called in question; but nothing herein contained is intended to justify the 
practice of wearing concealed weapons. MO. CONST. art. II, § 17.  
The current provision is: 
 
That the right of every citizen to keep and bear arms, ammunition, and 
accessories typical to the normal function of such arms, in defense of his home, 
person, family and property, or when lawfully summoned in aid of the civil 
power, shall not be questioned. The rights guaranteed by this section shall be 
unalienable. Any restriction on these rights shall be subject to strict scrutiny 
and the state of Missouri shall be obligated to uphold these rights and shall 
under no circumstances decline to protect against their infringement. Nothing 
in this section shall be construed to prevent the general assembly from 
enacting general laws which limit the rights of convicted violent felons or those 
duly adjudged mentally infirm by a court of competent jurisdiction. 
 
MO. CONST. art. I, § 23 (1945 Const., 2014 amend.). 
352 Id. at 529. 
353 Id. 
354 Wilforth at 529–30. 
355 Id. at 530. 
356 Heller at 626-27. 
 357 State v. Shelby, 90 Mo. 302, 2 S.W. 468 (1886). 
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drink.”358 He was convicted for carrying his revolver in violation of 1. The 
statute against concealed carry, and 2. The statute against carrying a deadly 
weapon while intoxicated (with an exception for self-defense).  
On appeal, the Missouri Supreme Court ruled that “a revolving pistol comes 
within the description of such arms as one may carry for the purposes 
designated in the constitution.”359 However, the concealed carry ban was 
expressly permitted by the state constitution. The ban on intoxicated carry was 
valid under the precedent of the school carry ban which had been upheld in 
Wilforth.  
The convictions of two separate offenses were nevertheless void. Both 
crimes were based on “but one carrying…[t]he fact that defendant took the 
pistol out and laid it upon his lap but furnished the proof of his guilt, and in no 
just sense can it be said the defendant was guilty of two distinct offenses.”360 
Because the state “could take a verdict of guilty for one offense, but not for 
both,” the convictions were reversed and remanded.361 
Bans on using firearms while intoxicated are now common.362 Wilforth may 
be the first case upholding such a ban. 
I. North Carolina 
State v. Speller (N.C. 1882).363 The 1876 constitution’s right to arms section 
explicitly excluded “the practice of carrying concealed weapons” and expressly 
authorized the legislature to enact penal laws against them.364 The legislature 
did so in 1879.365 
One Saturday night, L.R. Speller and Jenkins argued. According to Speller, 
Jenkins attempted to cut Speller with a razor and threatened that he would 
kill Speller very soon. Jenkins lived a half-mile from Speller. The nearest peace 
officer lived a mile and half away; the nearest justice, four miles. On Monday, 
Speller and Jenkins each went to court and swore out warrants against each 
other. When the officer came to arrest Speller, a search revealed the Speller 
was carrying a concealed handgun.366 
At trial, the judge refused to allow Speller to present his side of the story. 
The North Carolina Supreme Court ruled that the trial court had acted 
properly. Presuming that Speller’s self-defense story was correct, he could have 
carried the gun openly. “The right to wear secret weapons is no more essential 
                                            
358 Id. at 2 S.W. 469. 
359 Id. 
360 Id. at 469–70. 
361 Id. at 470. 
362 For the modern Missouri law, see, MO. STATS. § 571.030.1(5); Missouri v. Richard, 298 
S.W.3d 529 (Mo. 2009) (upholding statute); cf. People v. Garcia, 197 Colo. 550, 595 P.2d 228 
(1979) (applying a narrowing construction so that the statute only covers “actual or physical 
control”; it is not illegal to be drunk in the same room where one stores a firearm). 
 363 State v. Speller, 86 N.C. 697 (1882). 
364 N.C. CONSt. art. I, § 24 (1876). 
 365 Speller at 697. 
366 Id. at 697. 
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to the protection of one man than another, and surely it cannot be supposed 
that the law intends that an unwary advantage should be taken even of an 
enemy.”367 
J. West Virginia 
State v. Workman (W.V. 1891).368 A state statute banned the carrying of 
handguns, bowie knives, and some other weapons (but not long guns). The 
statute had several exceptions, including that if 
 
the defendant shall prove to the satisfaction of the jury that he is 
a quiet and peaceable citizen, of good character and standing in 
the community in which he lives, and at the time….he had good 
cause to believe, and did believe, that he was in danger of death 
or great bodily harm at the hands of another person, and that he 
was, in good faith, carrying such weapon for self–defense and for 
no other purpose, the jury shall find him not guilty.369 
 
Erastus Workman, of Boone County, was convicted in a bench trial of 
violating the carry statute. On appeal, he argued that he was entitled as a 
matter of law to an acquittal, based upon the statutory language.  
At trial, Erastus Workman had presented the testimony of Elsworth 
Workman, who said that he had heard George Ball threaten to murder Erastus 
Workman. The witness also said that he had warned Erastus of Ball’s threats. 
The witness said that George Ball has a well-deserved reputation as “a 
dangerous man.”370 
This testimony was buttressed Ester A. Ball, the sister of George Ball, and 
also his ex-wife. She testified that from the winter of 1888 through the spring 
of 1889, she had heard George Ball threaten to kill Erastus Workman, and had 
warned the defendant about the threats. She too considered that “George Ball 
was a very dangerous man.”371 Erastus Workman testified that he had been 
informed about the threats in the Spring of 1889, and had begun carrying a 
pistol thereafter, “for no other purpose than to defend himself against the said 
George Ball.”372 
The November 1891 Supreme Court decision does not specify on what date 
Erastus Workman had carried the handgun. Whenever it was, it was too long 
for the Supreme Court to consider the self-defense exception applicable. He 
                                            
 367 Id. at 700. 
 368 State v. Workman, 35 W.Va. 367, 14 S.E. 9 (1891). For a history of the arms right in 
West Virginia, see Stephen P. Halbrook, Rationing Firearms Purchases and the Right to Keep 
Arms: Reflections on the Bills of Rights of Virginia, West Virginia, and the United States, 96 
W.V. L. REV. 1 (1993). 
369 Workman, 14 S.E. at 9. 
370 Id. 
371 Id. at 10. 
372 Id. 
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had not gone to the authorities for help, and this negated his claim to be 
carrying “in good faith…for self–defense and for no other purpose.”373 
Workman used the civilized warfare test, stating it with unusual 
narrowness—the first court to include no handguns on the protected side. The 
right was for “swords, guns, rifles, and muskets,—arms to be used in defending 
the state and civil liberty” and not for “pistols, bowie–knife, brass knuckles, 
billies, and such other weapons as are usually employed in brawls, street 
fights, duels, and affrays, and are only habitually carried by bullies, 
blackguards, and desperadoes.”374 
The civilized warfare test for which arms are protected by the Second 
Amendment, which was invented by Aymette, and later employed by Andrews, 
Hill, English, and Workman, is obviously no longer valid; Heller is very clear 
that the individual right to keep and bear arms does not require any militia or 
military nexus for either the individual or the arm. Nevertheless, two courts, 
in defiance of Heller, have upheld arms bans partly on the basis that the arm 
in question is not a militia arm. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court 
did so in Commonwealth v. Caetano for electric stun guns, citing the aforesaid 
state cases.375 
Judge Easterbrook of the Seventh Circuit ignored Heller and Seventh 
Circuit precedent to uphold a ban on “assault weapons” and “large” magazines 
(over ten rounds).376 The case involved a municipal ban, and during oral 
argument, the plaintiffs agreed that the ban would be equally unconstitutional 
if it had been passed by the state.377 According to Chief Judge Easterbrook, 
“states, which are in charge of militias, should be allowed to decide when 
civilians can possess military-grade firearms, so as to have them available 
when the militia is called to duty.”378 Thus, state gun prohibitions are fine, 
because states are in charge of what arms the militia will have. 
This contradicts the constitutional text. The Constitution grants Congress, 
not the States, the power “To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining 
the Militia,” while “reserving to the States” the appointment of officers and 
training.379 Accordingly, Congress, and not state legislatures or city councils, 
is the source for what constitute militia arms. If the Highland Park militia test 
were to be applied by its own terms, then because Congress has not banned 
“assault weapons” or magazines, they are necessarily militia arms. 
Caetano and Highland Park fit well with several of the post-war cases, in 
that they remind us that some judges wish that there were no right to arms, 
and they will do what they can to make their wish a reality.  
 
                                            
373 Id. 
374 Id. 
375 Commonwealth v. Caetano, 470 Mass. 774, 779, 26 N.E.3d 688, 693 (2015). 
376 Friedman v. City of Highland Park, 784 F.3d 406 (7th Cir. 2015). 
377 Id. at 410–11. 
378 Id. at 410. 
379 U.S. CONST. art. I, §8 cl. 16 (emphasis added). 
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K. Illinois and Lyman Trumbull 
 
Before becoming a U.S. Senator from Illinois, Lyman Trumbull had been 
the state’s leading anti-slavery lawyer.380 In 1873 he returned to Illinois, 
practicing and teaching law in Chicago. While in the Senate, he had also often 
appeared as a lawyer before the Supreme Court, and he continued to build a 
Supreme Court practice after he returned to Illinois. 
According to his friend Clarence Darrow, Trumbull’s lifelong cause was “a 
fair chance” for “the poor who toil for a living in this world.”381 In Chicago, that 
would include immigrant laborers, whose right to assemble, protest, and strike 
was sometimes violently suppressed.  
Workingmen’s organizations such as German immigrant Lehr und Wehr 
Verein organized community sporting activities—and also trained with arms, 
for the expressed goal of protecting workers from violence.382 The training, 
drilling, and parading of such groups were outlawed by the 1879 Militia Act; 
the activities were only allowed if the Governor granted a special permit, and 
he had complete discretion to refuse.383 
1. Illinois v. Bielfeld 
Because the new law was so controversial, the Governor agreed that there 
should be a test case. In Illinois v. Bielfield, the Cook County Circuit Court 
declared that the new law violated the Second Amendment. The Circuit Court’s 
panel opinion was the longest exposition of the Second Amendment yet written 
by an American court. The Chicago Tribune reprinted the entire decision.384 
The Circuit Court analyzed the issue along of the lines of the antebellum 
Georgia and Louisiana courts: concealed carry could be banned, but not the 
open parade and drill of Lehr und Wehr Verein. The right to practice with arms 
included the right to practice in a group. 
But unfortunately for the challengers, Bielfield had procedural problems 
which made it impossible for Illinois (the losing party in the trial court) to 
appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court, for a definitive ruling. For the next case, 
Lyman Trumbull would be the lead attorney.  
                                            
380 See David B. Kopel, Lyman Trumbull: Author of the Thirteenth Amendment, Author of 
the Civil Rights Act, and the First Second Amendment Lawyer, 47 LOYOLA U. CHI. L.J. (issue 
4, forthcoming 2016), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2564819. 
381 CHI. TIMES, June 26, 1896, HORACE WHITE, THE LIFE OF LYMAN TRUMBULL 425–26 
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1913). 
382 Stephen P. Halbrook, The Right Of Workers To Assemble And To Bear Arms: Presser v. 
Illinois, One of the Last Holdouts against Application of the Bill of Rights to the States, 76 U. 
DET. MERCY L. REV. 943 (1999). This article is the best history of Illinois cases. 
383 An act to provide for the organization of the State militia, BRADWELL, LAWS OF ILLINOIS 
(1879), 149 (May 28, 1879) [hereinafter Militia Act]. 
384 Militia Law, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 2, 1879, at 6. 
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2. Dunne v. Illinois 
The formal basis of the second case was that the new law exempted Illinois 
National Guard officers from jury duty. Dunne, an Illinois officer, claimed the 
exemption when summoned for a jury; he refused to serve, so the trial judge 
held him in contempt, and fined Dunne $50. The Illinois Supreme Court agreed 
that on appeal it would consider all aspects of the Militia Act.385 
 By a 6-1 vote, the Court upheld the Militia Act.386 Most of the Court’s 
opinion was devoted to whether it was preempted by federal militia law. This 
raised the complicated question of whether Congress’s enumerated powers 
over the militia (in Article I, § 8, clauses 15–16) were exclusive of state power, 
or whether concurrent state power could exist. The leading Supreme Court 
case on the subject was Houston v. Moore (1814), and it was not a model of 
clarity.387 The Illinois Court decided that federal law still left room for Illinois 
to re-organize its militia. 
Illinois at the time had no express right to arms guarantee. Like Bielfield, 
the Dunne Court took it for granted that the right to arms was a limitation on 
all American governments, and that it included personal defense. But the 
Court scoffed at the idea that Lehr und Wehr Verein’s mass activities had 
anything to do with the right. “The right of the citizen to ‘bear arms’ for the 
defence of his person and property is not involved, even remotely, in this 
discussion.”388 
 
3. Presser v. Illinois 
In apparent abundance of caution, Trumbull had brought another test 
case.389 This one involved Lehr und Wehr Verein officer Hermann Presser. 
Carrying a sword, he had led a Labor Day parade of men carrying unloaded 
rifles.390 After being convicted of having led an armed parade without a permit, 
he was fined ten dollars, and appealed to the Illinois Supreme Court. For 
procedural reasons, the case lingered there for years.391 Finally, it was 
affirmed by an unpublished and terse per curiam opinion which just cited 
Dunne.392 But Presser was the case that the U.S. Supreme Court decided to 
hear. 
The Court refused to consider the federal militia law preemption issues, 
since they were irrelevant to the charge on which Presser had been convicted, 
“even if the other sections of the act were invalid.”393  
                                            
385 Dunne v. Illinois, 94 Ill. 120 (1879). 
386 Dunne at 140–41. 
387 Houston v. Moore, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 1 (1820) 
388 Dunne, 94 Ill. at 140. 
389 Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252 (1886). 
390 Halbrook at . 
391 Id. at.  
392 Id. at.  
393 Presser, 116 U.S. at 261–63. 
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On the Second Amendment, Trumbull’s brief argued that the Amendment 
was collective as well as individual. Requiring the Governor’s consent for 
“drilling, officering, organizing” was absurd, for this was “the consent, of the 
very man, against whose usurpation of powers, their organization and arming 
may, perhaps be directed, and lawfully so.”394  
The Illinois Attorney General answered: “the right to keep and bear arms 
by no means includes the right to assemble and publicly parade in the manner 
forbidden by the law under which the conviction in this case was had.”395 
The Supreme Court agreed with the Attorney General: the Illinois 
provisions “which only forbid bodies of men to associate together as military 
organizations, or to drill or parade with arms in cities and towns unless 
authorized by law, do not infringe the right of the people to keep and bear 
arms.”396 Besides that, the “conclusive answer” was Second Amendment “is a 
limitation only upon the power of Congress and the National government, and 
not upon that of the state.”397 As for the Privileges or Immunities claim, “The 
right voluntarily to associate together as a military company or organization, 
or to drill or parade with arms, without, and independent of, an act of congress 
or law of the state authorizing the same, is not an attribute of national 
citizenship.”398 
Whatever Cruikshank had meant, outside the South it apparently had not 
been uniformly construed by the public as shielding states from having to obey 
the Second Amendment. As a leading member of the Supreme Court bar, 
Trumbull would be unlikely spend his time on hopeless cases. Presser got the 
message across. An article summarizing Presser in the Central Law Journal 
concluded that “It will no doubt be news to most people, not members of the 
legal profession, and to many who are,” that the Second Amendment offered 
no protection from state anti-gun laws.399 
In an era fraught with urban riots and immigrant labor unrest, the 
Supreme Court was disinclined to protect large assemblies which might have 
revolutionary ideas.400 Heller does acknowledge that one purpose of the Second 
                                            
394 Petitioner’s Brief at 18, quoted in Halbrook, Right of Workers. 
395 Respondent’s Brief at 8, in Halbrook. 
396 Presser at 264–65. 
397 Id. at 265. The Court cited Cruikshank, Barron v. Baltimore, Newsom, Andews, and 
Fife, as well as some cases not involving the Second Amendment. Id. 
398 Id. at 267 
399 Constitutional Law--Militia--Right to Bear Arms, 22 CENT. L.J. 411, 412–13 (1886). The 
Central Law Journal was a weekly legal newspaper, first published in 1874, and continuing 
until 1827. It concentrated on the U.S. Supreme Court and the Mississippi Valley. 1 CENT. L.J. 
1 (Jan. 1, 1874). The publishers were John F. Dillon and Seymour D. Thompson. Dillon was a 
former Justice of the Iowa Supreme Court and (as of 1874), a Judge of the Eighth Circuit. Both 
were authors of influential treatises. 
400 Although the parade at issue, and Lehr und Wehr Werein in general had been peaceful, 
the Court warned that a ruling in favor of Presser would “deny the right of the state to disperse 
assemblages organized for sedition and treason, and the right to suppress armed mobs bent 
on riot and rapine.” Presser at 267. 
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Amendment is that “when the able-bodied men of a nation are trained in arms 
and organized, they are better able to resist tyranny.”401 Yet Heller is more 
about personal defense than anything else. “[T]he right of law-abiding, 
responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home” is the core of 
the core of the Heller right. 402 
Conclusion 
 As right to arms jurisprudence develops in the post-Heller era, the 
nineteenth century cases have attracted newfound interest. A look at the 
Westlaw “Citing References” finds that most of them have been cited several 
times, sometimes often, in judicial opinions and in appellate briefs. With a few 
exceptions such as Nunn, Aymette, and Andrews, most of them were obscure in 
the century before Heller. In the first century of Second Amendment cases, we 
can see some of the emerging contours of the Second Amendment as it is 
understood today: a right to own and carry handguns and other firearms for 
self-defense and other legitimate purposes—but not an unlimited right. There 
may be regulation of the manner of carry (open vs. concealed); carrying may be 
prohibited in sensitive places, such as courthouses and schools. Restrictions on 
giving handguns to unsupervised minors are not novel. Intoxicated use may be 
forbidden. 
 The jurisprudence of the nineteenth century, especially in the latter cases 
from Tennessee and Arkansas, also offers a negative example, which resulted 
in the evisceration of Second Amendment rights. By 1891, citizens of those 
states were greatly restricted in the choice of handguns they could purchase, 
and were disabled from carrying those handguns, in any reasonable manner, 
for self-defense outside their premises (except when on a journey). The first of 
the judicial sequence of errors was defining the right to arms narrowly, as only 
encompassing a few of the right’s purposes (militia, or resistance to tyranny). 
The next error was reliance on incorrect judicial intuition rather than fact-
finding to assert that certain arms (such as bowie knives) were not useful for 
the narrow purposes. 
 Some courts, such as Georgia’s, were able to uphold bans on concealed carry 
without that ban leading to a slippery slope of arms prohibition. Yet in other 
states, the ban on concealed carry led to ban on the sale of concealable 
handguns—thus depriving citizens of the handguns which might be the best 
choice (ergonomically or economically) for those citizens when defending 
hearth and home. The sensible notion that the manner of carrying may be 
regulated (open vs. concealed) was perverted by a purported “manner” 
regulation (“in the hand”) which amounted to “destruction of the right.” 
Eventually, prohibition becomes a categorical imperative, detached from 
common sense, common law, and constitutional right—so a gunsmith was 
                                            
401 Heller at 598. 
402 Id. at 635. 
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criminally convicted for having delivered a repaired handgun to a sheriff. In 
retrospect, the Kentucky Supreme Court’s decision not to start going down the 
slippery slope (Bliss, 1822, rejecting a ban on sword canes) helped prevent 
Kentucky from falling to the anti-constitutional depths of some other southern 
states.  
 Another lesson we can draw from the nineteenth century is that restrictive 
rules from the era may be abandoned if they no longer make sense. While the 
overwhelming majority of states in the nineteenth century did not prohibit any 
type of firearm, the states which did impose bans used the “civilized warfare” 
test. Although the test may not be clear at the margins, it was reasonably clear 
at the core, protecting the types of long guns and handguns typically carried 
by ordinary soldiers and their officers. But by the time Heller was decided, that 
test would have protected rifles that the public overwhelmingly did not want 
(such as the M-16 rifle) and would have greatly constricted the variety of 
handguns that the public did want. (“Civilized warfare” would protect the 
current military handgun, the Beretta 92, predecessors such as the Colt 1911, 
and similar guns from other manufacturers.) So the Heller Court wisely chose 
a broader reading of the Second Amendment right, not founded exclusively on 
whether a firearm is used by the military. 
 A similar reconsideration is due for concealed carry. While “civilized 
warfare” was the model only in a minority of especially restrictive states, 
concealed carry bans were widespread, and by 1891, they could be found in 
many states. Yet while the nineteenth century extolled open carry and feared 
concealed carry, social norms in the twenty-first century are different. All but 
a handful of states have fair, objective laws for issuing concealed carry licenses. 
Overwhelmingly, the manner in which Americans exercise their right to bear 
arms for lawful defense in public places today is by concealed carry, not open 
carry. While Heller’s description of the nineteenth century concealed carry 
cases was accurate, modern jurisprudence can recognize that on this subject, 
modern Americans have developed a more expansive vision of the right than 
the vision that their ancestors held in 1891. Indeed, the modern view of the 
legitimacy of concealed carry is closer to the original vision of 1791 than is the 
anti-concealment theory of the nineteenth century.  
 The nineteenth century cases on concealed carry can still play a modern 
role, by demonstrating the legitimacy of regulations for concealed carry 
licenses that many persons would consider inappropriate for mere possession 
of a firearm on one’s own property. These include biometric fingerprint-based 
background checks, an application process that can take weeks or months, 
mandatory safety training, and bounded discretion for a Sheriff or similar 
official to veto or revoke a concealed carry permit, based on particular facts 
about the individual. 
 Some people today think that the political battles over gun control have 
always been drawn on the same sectional lines. Yet during the latter 
nineteenth century, it was the Southern legislatures which were the most 
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ardent for gun control, while New York, Connecticut, and most of the rest of 
the country were not. Now, the roles are reversed, with New York City as the 
epicenter of gun prohibition advocacy, while Tennessee, Arkansas, and most 
Southern states have “F” ratings from the Brady Campaign.403 The historical 
variability of local enthusiasm for infringement on Second Amendment rights 
is one reason to reject special pleading to exempt various localities from 
compliance with the ordinary Second Amendment.404  
 The South eventually redeemed itself from Jim Crow gun control.405 Today, 
citizens of those states can, like Americans in most other states, choose from 
among the full range of handguns, not just the Army/Navy models. They can 
carry handguns, after going through a fair licensing system which respects the 
right of defensive carry. 
 As in the nineteenth century, judicial willingness to enforce the right to 
arms varies. The Jim Crow period offers precedents for modern judges who 
favor infringement or even elimination of Second Amendment rights. The 
better precedents from the nineteenth century are those favored by Heller and 
McDonald. They are consistent with the American tradition of ordered liberty, 
and of recognition that the Second Amendment is just as fundamental and 
deserving of judicial protection as the rest of the Bill of Rights.406 
                                            
403 Brady Campaign, 2013 State Scorecard, 
http://www.bradycampaign.org/sites/default/files/SCGLM-Final10-spreads-points.pdf. 
Twenty-seven states received a Brady “F.” Id.  
404 See Ruben & Cornell, supra (asserting that urban areas should be allowed to prohibit 
exercise of the right to bear arms). 
405 When ex-Confederate states threw off Reconstruction, and imposed white supremacy 
via Jim Crow laws, the phrase at the time was that the state had been “redeemed.” Robert J. 
Cottrol & Raymond T. Diamond, “Never Intended to be Applied to the White Population”: 
Firearms Regulation and Racial Disparity--The Redeemed South’s Legacy to a National 
Jurisprudence?, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1307 (1995). Today, the better understanding is the Jim 
Crow laws were un-American, and that true redemption involved the South’s rejection of the 
racist past. 
406 The Second Amendment is not “a second-class right, subject to an entirely different body 
of rules than the other Bill of Rights guarantees...” McDonald at 780. 
